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POPULAR ENFORCEMENT OF CONTROVERSIAL
LEGISLATION
Randy Beck*

Texas opted for popular enforcement of Senate Bill 8
("S.B. 8"), prohibitingabortion once a fetal heartbeat can be
detected. Rather than enforcement by government officials,
any member of the public may sue for statutory damagesfrom
any person who (1) performs an abortion violating the statute,
(2) knowingly aids or abets such an abortion, or (3) "intends"
to perform or aid and abet such an abortion.
The cause of action authorized by S.B. 8 is a "popular
action," a once common method of statutory enforcement
closely related to qui tam litigation. This Article draws on
the history of such litigation to argue against broad revival,
particularly with respect to controversial legislation.
Lawmakers had good reasonsfor moving away from popular
actions, which turn law enforcement into a profit-making
enterprise.

The financial incentives that spur popular enforcement
can lead litigants to engage in self-interested conduct
inconsistent with the public interest, like targeting technical
statutory violations tangential to the legislative objectives,
extorting secret payments to suppress litigation, encouraging
violations of the law to generate additional bounties, or
delaying enforcement so statutory penalties can accumulate.
Practices like these characterizedpopular enforcement of the
Gin Act 1736 and twentieth-century enforcement of the
Sunday Observance Act 1780, English statutes imposing
controversial legal restraints.
Where public opinion is already divided on the substance
of an enactment, popular enforcement tends to inflame preexisting social conflicts and undermine public respect for the
law. S.B. 8 is prone to abusive, marginal, and pointless
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enforcement actions analogous to those observed in our two
English case studies. Widespread litigation under the statute
by financially motivated informers is likely to produce
unintended consequences that cause even supporters of fetal
heartbeat legislation to regret reliance on popular
enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision to overrule Roe v. Wade1 in Dobbs
v. Jackson Women's Health Organization2 has inaugurated a period
in which many states may revisit their laws governing abortion. The
Court concluded that authority to regulate abortion rests with "the
people and their elected representatives." 3 Legislators in many states
will want to exercise that authority, albeit in different ways.
Some conservative states will be tempted to follow the path laid
out by the State of Texas in Senate Bill 8 ("S.B. 8"), prohibiting
abortion, except in medical emergencies, once a fetal heartbeat can be
detected. 4 The statute, which became effective while the Dobbs case
was pending, challenged then-controlling Supreme Court case law
indicating that states could not prohibit elective abortions before
"viability," when a fetus can survive outside the womb. 5 But that
aspect of the legislation did not make S.B. 8 unusual. Nearly a third
of the states had adopted pre-Dobbs legislation incompatible with the
viability rule, 6 and whether to allow greater regulation of previability abortions was the issue on which the Court granted
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022) (overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
3. Id.
4. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.203-171.204 (West 2021)
(as amended by S.B. 8); see also S. 8, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (original
text of S.B. 8). The statute defines "fetal heartbeat" as "cardiac activity or the
steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart within the

gestational sac." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.201(1) (West 2021).
Some medical providers object to the statute's terminology on the ground that the
cardiac electrical activity detected in an ultrasound early in pregnancy differs
from the opening and closing of heart valves that produces the sound of a

heartbeat in adults. See Selena Simmons-Duffin & Carrie Feibel, The Texas
Abortion Ban Hinges on "FetalHeartbeat."Doctors Call that Misleading, NPR:
POLICY-ISH, https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/09/02/1033727679/
fetal-heartbeat-isnt-a-medical-term-but-its-still-used-in-laws-on-abortion

(May

3, 2022, 4:45 PM).
5. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (before viability, State's interests are not
strong enough to support prohibition or substantial obstacles to elective
abortion). The District Court in United States v. Texas credited medical evidence
that the cardiac electrical impulse that triggers the Texas statutory prohibition
"can occur 'very early in pregnancy,' as soon as six weeks LMP or sometimes

sooner." United States v. Texas, 1:21-CV-796-RP, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6,
2021). Fetal viability is not currently possible at that stage of pregnancy. Id.
6. See State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions

(last updated May 3, 2022) ("16 states ... have attempted to ban abortion before
viability but have been stopped by court order.").
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certiorari in Dobbs, before taking up Mississippi's invitation to
reconsider the broader question of whether the federal Constitution
protects a right to abortion at all. 7 What made S.B. 8 unusually
controversial was not simply its incompatibility with then-controlling
constitutional doctrine, but the statute's uncommon method of
enforcement. Rather than providing that state officials can enforce
S.B. 8, the act authorizes any person (not employed by state or local
government) to sue for statutory damages of at least $10,000 from
anyone who (1) performs an abortion violating the statute,
(2) knowingly aids or abets such an abortion, or (3) "intends" to
perform or aid and abet such an abortion. 8
The provision for enforcement by any member of the public marks
S.B. 8 as a close relative of qui tam legislation. 9 The cause of action
authorized by S.B. 8 constitutes what Sir William Blackstone called
a "popular action," a broad category that includes qui tam actions as
a more familiar subcategory. 10 For hundreds of years in English and
early American law, popular enforcement played a central role in
statutory implementation, alongside suits by government officials
In a popular action, a private
and suits by injured parties."
individual-sometimes called an "informer" or "relator"-sues for a

7.

See Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619-20 (2021)

(granting certiorari "limited to Question 1 presented by the petition"); Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Dobbs, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392) (Question
1: "Whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are
unconstitutional."). In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I filed an amicus

brief in support of Mississippi in the Dobbs case. See Brief of Professor Randy
Beck as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's
Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) (No. 19-1392).
8. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208 (West 2021).
9. See Jenna Greene, Crafty Lawyering on Texas Abortion Bill Withstood
SCOTUS
Challenge,
REUTERS
(Sept.
5,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/crafty-lawyering-texas-abortion-bill-

withstood-scotus-challenge-greene-2021-09-05/ (architects of S.B. 8 "figured out
how to apply qui tam statutes . .. in the abortion law context"); see also Jonathan

F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-ErasureFallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 1001 (2018) (former
Texas Solicitor General who helped draft S.B. 8 suggesting that "providing for
private enforcement through civil lawsuits and qui tam relator actions" can
"enable private litigants to enforce a statute even after a federal district court

has enjoined the executive from enforcing it").
10.

See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 160.

11. See generally Evan Caminker, The Constitutionalityof Qui Tam Actions,
99 YALE L.J. 341, 343-44 (1989); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the
English Eradicationof Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 550-51, 56566 (2000) [hereinafter Beck, English Eradication]; Randy Beck, Qui Tam
Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional Implications of a
Neglected History, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1254 (2018) [hereinafter Beck,
Qui Tam Litigation];Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH.
UNIV. L.Q. 81, 83.
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statutory forfeiture. 12 The informer does not need to demonstrate any
particularized injury or personal connection to the challenged
conduct, making popular enforcement an exception to modern rules
of standing. 13 Instead, the statute itself gives the litigant a stake in
the lawsuit, allowing a successful informer to keep part or all of the
money or property forfeited by the defendant. 14 Commentators have
analogized informers to bounty hunters 15 and have compared the
financial incentive in a qui tam statute to a contingent-fee
arrangement.16

Popular enforcement of abortion regulations is a surprising
The long Anglo-American history of popular
development. 17

12.
ACT

CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40785, QUl TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS
AND
RELATED
FEDERAL
STATUTES
1
(2021),

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R40785.pdf.
13. The Supreme Court relied on the long history of qui tam legislation in
England and the United States to find qui tam litigation consistent with Article
III's "case" or "controversy" requirement, even though the relator suffers no
particularized injury distinct from the communal injury resulting from a
violation of the law. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,

529 U.S. 765, 774-78 (2000). See generally Howard M. Wasserman & Charles W.
"Rocky" Rhodes, Solving the ProceduralPuzzles of the Texas HeartbeatAct and
Its Imitators: The Limits and Opportunitiesof Offensive Litigation, 71 AM. U. L.
REV. 1029, 1039 (2022) ("The [S.B. 8] plaintiff need not allege or prove personal
injury to obtain a remedy.").
14. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *159-60.

15.

See Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 141

S. Ct. 2494, 2498 (2021)

(Sotomayor,.J., dissenting) ("In effect, the Texas Legislature has deputized the

State's citizens as bounty hunters, offering them cash prizes for civilly
prosecuting their neighbors' medical procedures."); Isaac B. Rosenberg, Raising
the Hue ... and Crying: Do False Claims Act Qui Tam Relators Act Under Color
of FederalLaw?, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 271, 292 (2008) ("Many commentators have
likened qui tam relators to bounty hunters.").

16.

Beck, English Eradication, supra note 11, at 541 ("[Q]ui tam statutes

privatize government litigation, permitting the private informer to sue for the
government on a contingent-fee basis."); United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vt.

Agency of Nat. Res., 162 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The real party in interest
in a qui tam suit is the United States.... [T]he qui tam plaintiff has an interest
in the action's outcome, but his interest is less like that of a party than that of an
attorney working for a contingent fee."), rev'd on other grounds, 529 U.S. 765

(2000); but see United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 290
n.18 (5th Cir. 1999) (unlike a contingent fee lawyer, a qui tam relator owes no
legal duty to further the interests of the government).

17. A growing body of academic literature addresses the history of popular
enforcement. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 11, at 341-43; Beck, Qui Tam
Litigation, supra note 11, at 1259-1305; Beck, English Eradication,supra note
11, at 565-608; Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a
ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 816-17 (1969); Steven L. Winter,
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1406-09 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, What's StandingAfter Lujan?: Of Citizen
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enforcement still plays a significant role in modern debates about
constitutional interpretation, but such statutes have largely falien
out of favor with lawmakers. 18 England began the process of
repealing its remaining popular actions in 1951.19 Most statutes
creating popular or qui tam actions in the United States have also
been repealed or fallen into disuse, the principal exception being the
federal False Claims Act and comparable state-level enactments
aimed at protecting the government against fraud. 20
This Article draws on the history of qui tam and other popular
actions to argue against broad revival of popular enforcement,
particularly with respect to controversial legislation. For many
readers, the fact that the Texas statute seeks to regulate abortion at
a relatively early stage in pregnancy will be a sufficient reason to
oppose the legislation. But the goal of this Article is to convince even
people who might support S.B. 8's abortion-related legislative aims to
reject the method of enforcement, and to advise caution for legislators
wondering whether S.B. 8 might serve as a template for enforcement
in other controversial areas of law.
Texas resorted to popular enforcement of S.B. 8 in an effort to
limit pre-enforcement judicial review of its fetal heartbeat legislation.
Before Dobbs, abortion providers often challenged state abortion
regulations in federal court before they went into effect, seeking
preliminary injunctions against state officials with enforcement
powers. 2 1 Texas legislators sought to avoid that outcome by letting
Suits, "Injuries,"and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 164 (1992); James E.
Pfander, Public Law Litigation in Eighteenth Century America: Diffuse Law
Enforcement for a PartisanWorld (forthcoming) (on file with author).
18. See Beck, Qui Tam Litigation, supra note 11, at 1305-16 (discussing
constitutional implications of long history of popular enforcement of duties of

government officials); Beck, English Eradication, supra note 11, at 553-55
(discussing small number of remaining federal qui tam statutes); Caminker,
supra note 11, at 341 (discussing "relative obscurity" of qui tam enforcement

today); id. at 354-87 (discussing status of qui tam litigation under Articles II and
III of U.S. Constitution).
19. See Beck, English Eradication,supranote 11, at 604-08.
20. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 342 ("Most early qui tam statutes have
long been repealed; of those remaining, most lie essentially dormant."). The

federal False Claims Act is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. Federal law
creates financial incentives for states to enact their own qualifying false claims
statutes. See State False ClaimsAct Reviews, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN.,

https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/state-false-claims-act-reviews/

(last visited May 22, 2022); see also, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12650-12656 (West
2013).
21. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 264 F. Supp. 3d 813, 825
(W.D. Tex. 2017) (temporary restraining order preventing Texas Attorney
General and other state officials from enforcing law requiring physician to bring

about fetal demise prior to performing dilation and evacuation abortion); see
generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (sovereign immunity did
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private citizens enforce S.B. 8 and explicitly denying state officials
The Fifth Circuit had
power to implement the legislation. 22
to a state law
challenge
previously rejected a pre-enforcement
who performed
a
doctor
against
affording private citizens a tort claim
23
Fifth Circuit
the
hoped,
As the Texas Legislature
an abortion.
As
a
result, many
8.24
stay
of
S.B.
deny
a
to
applied that precedent
with the
comply
to
services
back
their
pared
clinics
Texas abortion
to
traveling
began
of
women
number
statute and a significant
25
States
United
The
states.
surrounding
abortion providers in
Supreme Court initially authorized a narrow pre-enforcement claim
against state medical licensing officials, reading S.B. 8 to allow
certain enforcement activities by those officials, but the Texas
Supreme Court shut the door to that avenue of relief when it
construed the statute to bar enforcement through licensing actions. 2 6
Texas's success in limiting pre-enforcement judicial review of its
fetal heartbeat bill led other conservative-leaning states to consider
measures comparable to the Texas statute. Idaho authorized a more
circumscribed civil action against medical professionals who perform
post-heartbeat abortions. 27 Oklahoma enacted legislation closely

not bar suit for injunctive relief against state official seeking to enforce
unconstitutional state statute).
22. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.207(a) (West 2021).

23.
24.

Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 409, 429 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 13 F.4th 434, 442-43 (5th Cir. 2021)

(per curiam). By the time the Fifth Circuit released its opinion, the Supreme
Court had already rejected an emergency request to intervene. Whole Woman's

Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495-96 (2021).
25. Petitioner's Brief at 14-15, Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct.
522 (2021) (No. 21-463).
26. Compare Whole Woman's Health, 142 S. Ct. at 531-37 (2021), with Whole
Woman's Health v. Jackson, 642 S.W.3d 569, 583 (Tex. 2022) (opinion on certified
question from United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit). At the same

time that the Supreme Court considered the clinics' case, it also heard oral
argument in a case brought by the Department of Justice against the State of
Texas, but the Court ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently

granted. United States v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 522, 522 (2021). Meanwhile, fourteen
suits were filed in the state courts seeking pre-enforcement review of S.B. 8. The
cases were consolidated for pretrial proceedings, Van Stean v. Tex. Right to Life,

No. D-1-GN-21-004179, slip op. at 3 (Dist. Ct. Travis Cnty., Tex. Dec. 9, 2021),
and the judge

granted partial

judgment that S.B.

summary judgment,

issuing a declaratory

8 violated Texas law concerning standing,

imposed

punishment without due process of law and violated Texas law regarding
delegation of executive authority. Id. at 47 (granting declaratory relief, but
denying injunctive relief pending trial on the merits).
27. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 25, at 48; S. 1309 § 6, 6 6 th Leg., 2d Reg.

Sess. (Idaho 2022); S. 1358 § 1, 66th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2022); Kelcie
Moseley-Morris, Idaho Governor Signs Bill Effectively Banning Most Abortions,
IDAHO CAP. SUN, https://idahocapitalsun.com/2022/03/23/idaho-governor-signs-
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modeled on the Texas law. 28 Meanwhile, those on the other end of the
political spectrum have openly discussed whether liberal states
should adopt similar legislation to enforce controversial regulations
in other sensitive areas. 29 Governor Gavin Newsom of California
signed legislation modeled on the Texas statute creating a popular
action against anyone who manufactures, distributes, transports, or
imports assault weapons or certain other banned firearms or parts.3 0
The Petitioner's brief for the Supreme Court in Whole Woman's
Health v. Jackson indicates that comparable legislation has been
introduced in Illinois to regulate gun possession and argues that
analogous enforcement mechanisms could be used in contexts
relating to marriage rights, flag burning, religious freedom,
immigration, and campaign expenditures. 3 1
There may be limited areas in which popular enforcement makes
sense. 32 But there are good reasons why lawmakers moved away from
widespread reliance on popular actions, which turn law enforcement

bill-effectively-banning-most-abortions/ (Mar. 23, 2022). The Idaho legislation is
more narrowly tailored than the Texas legislation.

It does not allow suit by any

member of the public, but only by "[a] female upon whom an abortion has been
attempted or performed, the father of the preborn child, a grandparent of the

preborn child, a sibling of the preborn child, or an aunt or uncle of the preborn
child." See S. 1358 § 1, 66th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2022). The statute allows
recovery of actual damages and statutory damages of $20,000, but liability is
limited to "medical professionals" who "attempted, performed or induced" a postheartbeat abortion. Id. The Idaho legislation does not include a provision like
the Texas law allowing suit against anyone who aids or abets an abortion

violating the statute. See id.
28. See Oklahoma Heartbeat Act, 63 OKLA. ST. ANN. §§ 1-745.31-1-745.44
(2022).
29. See Alison Durkee, CaliforniaMoves Forward with Gun Control Bill
that Mimics Structure of Texas Abortion Ban, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2022, 3:22 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2022/02/18/california-moves-forwardwith-gun-control-bill-that-mimics-structure-of-texas-abortion-

ban/?sh=60852d4b7897.
30. See Veronica Stacqualursi, Newsom Signs California Gun Bill Modeled
After
Texas
Abortion
Law,
CNN (July
22,
2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/22/politics/california-newsom-gun-billtexas-abortion-law/index.html; California Senate Bill 1327 (signed July 22, 2022)
(CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, Ch. 38, §§ 22949.62, 22949.65).
31. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 25, at 48-50.
32. Selectively reviving carefully circumscribed qui tam litigation against
government officials could enhance legal accountability in contexts where rules

of standing make enforcement actions difficult to pursue. See Randy Beck,
Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, 21 C HAP. L.
REV. 41, 41-43 (2018); Randy Beck & John Langford, Reviving Qui Tam
Monitoring of Executive Branch Officials, LAWFARE (Jan. 22, 2020, 8:06 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/reviving-qui-tam-monitoring-executive-branch-

officials.
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into a profit-making enterprise. 33 While a government attorney
enforcing a statute may act out of self-interest, the attorney faces
institutional and political constraints that moderate the enforcement
process and help protect the public interest. 34 Popular enforcement,
on the other hand, expressly appeals to a litigant's desire for financial
gain and permits pursuit of private agendas that distort the
enforcement process, undermining legislative goals and shortchanging the common good. 35
Part I of the Article argues that legislation providing for popular
litigation tends to undermine important ideals relating to the process
of statutory enforcement.3 6 A law creating a popular action includes
a built-in conflict of interest. A person filing a popular action
represents the communal interest in law enforcement, but
simultaneously pursues private financial gain and sometimes other
personal objectives as well. 37 The financial incentives and personal
motives that spur popular enforcement have historically led to a
laundry list of self-interested practices by informers that undermine
the public interest. The conflict of interest inherent in popular
enforcement manifests itself, for instance, when informers file claims
based on technical statutory violations tangential to the legislative
objectives, extort secret payments to suppress litigation, encourage
violations of the law to create new litigation targets, or delay
enforcement so statutory penalties can accumulate.
Part II offers two historical case studies of popular enforcement
of controversial legislation. We first consider a 1736 English statute
enlisting informers to suppress unlicensed retail sales of gin and

33.

2 LEON RADZINoWIcZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS

ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 139 (1956) (enforcement by common informers

consistently and sharply criticized); see generally NIcHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST
THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-

1940, at 1 (2013) (overview of process by which our institutions made "the absence
of the profit motive a defining feature of government").

34. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Models for ProsecutorialAccountability,
2016 CARDOzo L. REV. DE NOVO 132, 136 (2016) (prosecutorial obligations
enforceable through "disciplinary systems, judicial control over prosecutorial
conduct, and internal systems within the prosecutors' offices"); Morrison v.

Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing political
and institutional checks on executive branch prosecutors that are absent in the
case of an independent counsel).

35. See Andrew Keshner, Texas Abortion Law: $10,000 Penalty Could
Incentivize 'Bounty Hunters' to Make 'Tens of Thousands of Dollars,'
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/texasabortion-law-10-000-penalty-could-incentivize-bounty-hunters-to-make-tens-of-

thousands-of-dollars-11630609738.
36.

37.

See infra notes 46-204 and accompanying text.
See 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 138.
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other distilled liquors. 38 Informers enforcing the legislation routinely
deceived merchants into violating the statute, sought unjustified
recoveries against innocent defendants through perjury, or extorted
secret payments from potential litigation targets. Informers became
so unpopular that they were repeated targets of mob violence, with
several losing their lives and others forced into naval service by
British "press gangs." 39 The judiciary abandoned attempts to enforce
the statute, and Parliament eventually replaced the controversial
regulatory scheme. 40
The second case study considers twentieth-century enforcement
Professional
England's
1780 Lord's Day Observance Act. 41
of
informers sought to enrich themselves through litigation to defend
"the English Sunday," targeting popular recreational activities and
shutting down charitable fundraisers designed to benefit British
troops during and after World War 11.42 Following embarrassing
press accounts of the activities of self-interested informers, some of
whom did not share the legislation's Sabbatarian aims, Parliament
responded in 1951 by eliminating England's remaining statutory
provisions that allowed popular enforcement. 43
The emergence of analogous problems in these two very different
social and legal contexts highlights the structural flaw embedded in
legislation providing for popular actions. Self-interested informers
wielding law enforcement powers tend to inflame pre-existing social
conflicts. As accounts of unwarranted enforcement actions and
abusive litigation tactics circulate, the public tends to lose respect for
laws subject to popular enforcement, particularly in contexts where
opinions were already divided on the underlying legislative
mandates.
Part III discusses ways that the conflict of interest inherent in
popular enforcement could produce abusive and pointless litigation
under S.B. 8 if the Texas statute ever becomes widely enforced. 44 The
legislation creates numerous opportunities for self-interested
litigation targeting individuals and companies with little or no
connection to the state's abortion industry and includes features
making it difficult to defend against an S.B. 8 action, even if the

38.

See infra notes 209-337 and accompanying text.

39. See Jessica Warner & Frank Ivis, "DamnYou, You Informing Bitch."
Vox Populi and the Unmaking of the Gin Act of 1736, 33 J. Soc. HIsT. 299, 317,
319 (1999).
40. Id. at 320.
41.
42.

See infra notes 338-520 and accompanying text.
See The Common Informer: Council Seeks a Way Out, KINEMATOGRAPH

WKLY., Feb. 10, 1944, at 20.
43. See Lord's Day Act Informer, YORKSHIRE OBSERVER, July 2, 1951, at 3
(royal assent granted to bill abolishing common informers).
44. See infra notes 521-627 and accompanying text.
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defendant complied with statutory requirements. 45 Widespread
litigation under S.B. 8 by financially motivated informers could easily
become corrosive to the rule of law, undermining public respect for
the legal system and causing even supporters of fetal heartbeat
legislation to regret the scheme of popular enforcement.
I. CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN POPULAR ACTIONS
Sir William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England, discusses "penal statutes" that impose forfeitures for
conduct violating legislative requirements. 46 The defendant who
violates a penal statute must give the money or property forfeited "to
such persons as the law requires." 47 "The usual application of this
forfeiture," according to Blackstone, "is either to the party grieved, or
else to any of the king's subjects in general." 48 A statutory recovery
by a person aggrieved or injured by unlawful conduct is a common
feature of modern law. 49 We are less familiar though with the other
category Blackstone describes:
[M]ore usually, these forfeitures created by statute are given at
large, to any common informer; or, in other words, to any such
person or persons as will sue for the same: and hence such
actions are called popular actions, because they are given to the
people in general. Sometimes one part is given to the king, to
the- poor, or to some public use, and the other part to the
informer or prosecutor; and then the suit is called a qui tam
action, because it is brought by a person "qui tam pro domino
50
rege, & c, quam pro seipso in hac parte sequitur."

In Blackstone's taxonomy, the S.B. 8 cause of action falls within the
"genus" of "popular actions" because the statute provides for a
forfeiture to be recovered by any member of the public who will sue
for it.51 As a technical matter, a claim filed under S.B. 8 does not fall
within the "species" of "qui tam actions" because the successful

See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208 (West 2021).
BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *159.
Id.
48. Id. at *159-60.
49. See, e.g., Anderson v. Credit Bureau Collection Servs., Inc., 422 F. App'x.
534, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2011) ("an aggrieved consumer may recover actual or
45.

46.
47.

statutory damages not exceeding $1,000" under Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k).
50. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *160. (emphasis omitted). The United
States Supreme Court translated Blackstone's Latin phrase to mean "who
pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own." Vt. Agency

of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000).
51. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208 (West 2021).
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litigant gets to keep the entire forfeiture and does not split it with the
government or the poor or devote any portion to a public use. 52
Informers in popular actions operate under incentive structures
and expectations very different than those applied to government
officials. Individuals who work for the government are typically paid
a fixed salary and expected to perform duties for the benefit of the
public, rather than for any personal or private benefit. 53 In the
context of statutory enforcement, this includes selecting enforcement
targets to further legislative aims, while minimizing negative
consequences associated with the enforcement process.5 4 By contrast,
legislation creating a qui tam or popular action places the power of
statutory enforcement in the hands of any person willing to bring a
lawsuit. 55 The statute expressly encourages litigation motivated by
the hope of personal financial rewards. 56 The desire for pecuniary
gain and other private interests of informers regularly produce
enforcement activities that conflict with public interests affected by
the enforcement process. 57

52.

See id. The term "popular enforcement" in this article encompasses all

popular actions, including qui tam actions.

For our purposes, Blackstone's

technical distinction between the broad set of "popular actions" and the subset of
"qui tam actions" makes little difference. Any statute creating a popular action
authorizes an uninjured private litigant to enforce the law for the benefit of the
public and offers the litigant a contingent economic benefit to incentivize that law
enforcement activity. The problems with popular enforcement discussed below
flow from conflicts between public interests associated with the process of law
enforcement and the private interests of informers. These problems could arise
under any statute creating a popular action, whether or not they meet
Blackstone's criterion for qui tam legislation. If anything, a popular action that
does not constitute a qui tam action may create greater problems because the
economic incentive to file suit is stronger when the informer does not need to split
the recovery with the government or other beneficiaries.
53. Richard W. Painter, Ethics and Government Lawyering in Current

Times, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 965, 966 (2019) ("The big picture here is that
government officials should be responsible to the public and should not be making
decisions based on their own personal, financial interests."); NICHOLAS R.
PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE, supra note 33, at 1 ("In America today,

the lawful income of a public official consists of a salary.").
54.

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 847-48 (8th ed.

2011) (discussing case selection by a public agency considering costs and benefits
of possible resource allocations).
55. See Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 608-09.
56. See id. at 608-09, 611.
57. See 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 138 (common informer's "aim was
not justice, but gain"); Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 608-09, 611.
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PersonalInterests of Government Attorneys and Private

A.

Informers
The process of enforcing a law involves a wide range of
discretionary decisions, including questions concerning who should
face enforcement actions, what conduct should be challenged, and
The
many subsidiary issues of substance and procedure. 58
enforcement process will be guided to a significant extent by the
mindset a litigant brings to those discretionary determinations. In
thinking through the incentive structure underlying popular
enforcement, it helps to compare the financial inducements offered to
informers with the very different expectations applied to government
attorneys.
We expect public officials carrying out their responsibilities to
serve the public interest. 59 The Supreme Court has explained that
the government attorney's duty to the public imposes higher
obligations than those facing an attorney for an ordinary party. 60
Since the sovereign is required to govern impartially, the
government's true interest in any case is not victory, but rather that
justice be done. 61 The government attorney must operate as a
"servant of the law," seeking to ensure both "that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer."6 2 The attorney may pursue suspected
lawbreakers "with earnestness and vigor," yet "while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." 63
To strengthen government officials' commitment to the public
interest, we typically require "disinterested" performance of public
duties. 64 Government attorneys and other public officials may not
work on matters that significantly affect their personal or private
interests. 65 Reasoning from the government obligation to impartially
pursue justice, for instance, the Supreme Court in Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.66 invoked its supervisory power to

58.

See Bruce

A. Green,

Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and

Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 596 (2019) ("Prosecutorial
discretion pervades every aspect of prosecutors' work."); In re Aiken Cnty., 725

F.3d 255, 264 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (executive branch likely has the same power
to exercise discretion with respect to civil penalties and sanctions as it does in
criminal matters).

59. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980).
60. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 528; 18 U.S.C. § 208.
65. See Painter, supra note 53, at 966 ("[G]overnment officials should be
responsible to the public and should not be making decisions based on their own
personal, financial interests.").

66. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
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throw out a criminal contempt conviction where the trial court had
appointed counsel for a private company to prosecute the contempt
action. 67 The Young Court reasoned that the government's interest
"in dispassionate assessment of the propriety of criminal charges"
might conflict with the private client's interest in enforcing the court
order:
A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported
prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards
for the private client. Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted
to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing
on a
is conditioned
client
to the private
benefits
recommendation against criminal charges. 68

This requirement of disinterested action by government officials
is reinforced by legislation at the federal level. 69 The Department of
Justice is statutorily required to ensure that its employees do not
participate in an "investigation or prosecution" that "may result in a
personal, financial, or political conflict of interest, or the appearance
thereof." 70 A federal employee, including a prosecutor, can face
criminal charges for "personally and substantially" participating in a
matter affecting the employee's financial interests or those of certain
family members or businesses. 7 1
Like the Supreme Court in Young, many other federal and state
courts have enforced the norm requiring disinterested performance of
law enforcement functions, seeking to prevent attorneys from making
significant decisions about enforcing the law while laboring under a
conflict of interest. 72 In United States v. Spiker,73 the Eleventh
Circuit found clear error undermining a guilty plea where a federal
prosecutor failed to recuse himself after the defendant tried to have
the prosecutor killed and then attempted to smuggle a weapon into
the courtroom to carry out the attack himself.74 In United States v.
Miller,75 the Ninth Circuit criticized a federal prosecutor's "disregard
of elementary prosecutorial ethics" in seeking an FBI investigation
67. Id. at 790, 805-06.
68. Id. at 805.
69. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 528; 18 U.S.C. § 208.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 528.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 208; see also id. § 216 (specifying punishments for those
charges).
72. See generally, e.g., United States v. Spiker, 649 F. App'x 770, 774 (11th
Cir. 2016) (prosecutor's failure to recuse after defendant's threatening and
actually attempting to kill him); State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 311-12, 316
(Tenn. 2000) ("special interest group" attorney working with county district

attorney's office to prosecute obscenity cases).
73. 649 F. App'x 770 (11th Cir. 2016).
74. Id. at 771-74.
75. 953 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2020).
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and participating in the early stages of a criminal case concerning
embezzlement from a company owned by the prosecutor's father. 76
The court upheld the conviction only because the Justice Department
took steps to eliminate any taint arising from the conflicted
prosecutor's involvement. 77 The Fifth Circuit, in Griffith v. Oles (In
re Hipp, Inc.), 78 overturned a contempt conviction sought by the
trustee of a bankruptcy estate on the ground that the bankruptcy
estate had a financial interest in the prosecution. 79
The Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Culbreath80
is particularly instructive with respect to the influence of financial
interests on decisions regarding enforcement of the law. 81 A public
prosecutor arranged for a private attorney to work with the
prosecutor's office in investigating potential obscenity violations by
sexually-oriented businesses in the county. 82 The private attorney
was compensated for his time and expenses by private donors,
including an interest group called Citizens for Community Values,
Inc. ("CCV"), receiving more than $410,000 over a nineteen-month
period. 83 The court noted that "prosecutors are expected to be
impartial" and that "charging decisions should be based upon the
evidence, without discrimination or bias for or against any groups or
individuals." 84 In the Culbreath case, the outside attorney working
with the public prosecutor's office had a conflict of interest:
He was privately compensated by a special interest group and
thus owed a duty of loyalty to that group; at the same time, he
was serving in the role of public prosecutor and owed the duty
of loyalty attendant to that office. Moreover, because [the
attorney] was compensated on an hourly basis, the reality is
that he acquired a direct financial interest in the duration and
85
scope of the ongoing prosecution.

Given the private attorney's extensive involvement in prosecution
decisions, the court concluded the indictments should be dismissed
86
under the due process protections of the Tennessee Constitution.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1099-1100.
Id. at 1105-06.
895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1506-09.
30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2000).
See generally id.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 317-18. The court relied upon the "law of the land" provision of

the Tennessee Constitution, which had been interpreted to afford due process

protections higher than the minimum level of protection required by U.S.
Supreme Court case law. See id. at 317 (citing TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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Legislation creating a qui tam or popular action places informers
a
conflict of interest very much like those we seek to avoid for
in
government attorneys. 87 The statute deputizes the informer to
pursue the public interest in enforcing the law but also offers the
informer a private financial reward if the action succeeds. 88 The
public interests connected with the law enforcement process and the
informer's private interest in the statutory bounty may sometimes
align perfectly. But there will inevitably be situations where the
public interest and the informer's private interests diverge. 89 The
Supreme Court explained in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex
rel. Schumer9 0 that the private rewards offered by a qui tam statute
lead informers to think differently about litigation decisions than
government attorneys: "As a class of plaintiffs, qui tam relators are
different in kind than the Government. They are motivated primarily
by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good." 91
The incentive structures applicable to private informers can lead
them to pursue cases a government attorney would reject. For
example, the Supreme Court suggested that private qui tam relators
under the False Claims Act ("FCA") would be "less likely than . .. the
Government to forgo an action arguably based on a mere technical
noncompliance with reporting requirements that involved no harm to
the public fisc." 92
The Court acknowledged that, historically,
"informer statutes were highly subject to abuse." 93 Nevertheless, in
the context of the FCA, the Court has long deferred to the
congressional decision to select qui tam litigation as a means of
statutory enforcement:
[The FCA qui tam provision was] passed upon the theory, based
on experience as old as modern civilization, that one of the least
expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the
Treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions
by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong
stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain. Prosecutions
conducted by such means compare with the ordinary methods

87. Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 609-15.
88. See id. at 611.
89. See id. at 615.
90. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
91. Id. at 949.
92. Id.
93. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
775 (2000) (noting Sir Edward Coke's observation that informers had used
"obsolete" qui tam statutes to "vex and entangle the
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *192)).

subject"

(quoting
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as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public

vessel.94
In this view, a legislature may find the financial inducement offered
by a qui tam statute justified because it minimizes the burden on
government resources and promotes more vigorous enforcement than
when public officials monopolize the enforcement process.
Recognition of the common informer's conflict of interest can be
found at least as early as Sir Edward Coke's seventeenth-century
Institutes of the Laws of England.95 Coke lauded regulatory reforms
designed to restrain "the vexatious informer. .. who under the
reverend mantle of law and justice instituted for the protection of the
innocent, and the good of the common-wealth, did vex and
depauperize the subject, and commonly the poorer sort, for malice or
private ends, and never for love of justice." 96 On the one hand, in
Coke's view, the informer assumed the "mantle" of the public interest,
acting to enforce laws designed to protect the innocent and promote
the common good. 97 On the other hand, the informer's self-interested
motives conflicted with the common good the informer purported to
champion. Informers acted for "malice or private ends," not for "love
of justice." 98
The most common and pervasive "private end" pursued by
informers is financial gain. 99 A popular action allows an informer to
sue for and keep part or all of a statutory forfeiture imposed on the
defendant.1 00 But the grant of universal standing to members of the
public also allows informers to pursue other private agendas in
addition to the hope of profit. 10 1 Coke's reference to informers acting
from "malice" corresponds to the Supreme Court's recognition that
qui tam actions might be motivated by "personal ill will."10 2 An
informer can vent animosity toward a foe or rival by initiating a
popular action that puts the defendant at legal risk and forces him to
respond to charges of unlawful conduct.
The "private ends" that motivate informers can also be ideological
in nature. A good example can be found in the religiously motivated
Societies for the Reformation of Manners ("Societies") that sprang up
in London and other cities in the late seventeenth and early
94. Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 949 (quoting United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943)).
95. See generally CoKE, supra note 93, at *192-93 (discussing "three
mischiefs" arising from common informer statutes).
96. Id. at *194.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 622.
100. Id. at 551 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at * 160).
101. Id. at 607.
102.

Compare supra notes 94 and 96 and accompanying text.
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eighteenth centuries. 103 The Societies employed common informers
to enforce statutes targeting vices like cursing, drunkenness,
adultery, prostitution, or profaning the Sabbath. 104 Recognizing the
unpopularity of qui tam litigation in other contexts, supporters of the
Societies sought to distinguish these informers as reform-minded
community advocates, pursuing litigation out of love for God and
neighbor. 105 Some informers working for the Societies reportedly
refused to accept their share of fines from cases they pursued, though
at least some received a salary directly from the organizations that
employed them. 106
In cataloguing "private ends" that might motivate informers
pursuing popular enforcement, we should also mention one other
possible motivation: helping regulated parties. Early in the history
of qui tam legislation, potential defendants figured out ways to work
with friendly informers to shield illegal conduct from the full weight
of penalties imposed by a statutory regime. 107 Some informers have
thus pursued popular actions as part of an effort to undermine the
effectiveness of a legislative remedy. 108 We will discuss below how
the collusion between defendants and informers worked and the
legislative response designed to address the practice. 109
B.

Manifestations of Informers' Conflict of Interest

Sir Leon Radzinowicz, a historian of English criminal law,
observed that "[flew, if any, instruments of criminal justice were more
consistently or more sharply criticised than was the common

103. See Angela M. Laughlin, Learning from the Past? Or Destined to Repeat
Past Mistakes? Lessons from the English Legal System and Its Impact on How
We View the Role of Judges and Juries Today, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 357, 368-69
(2009).
104. Jeanne Clegg, Reforming Informing in the Long Eighteenth Century,
TEXTUS XVII 337, 343-48 (2004); Reformation of Manners Campaigns, LONDON
LIvES 1690 TO 1800: CRIME, POVERTY & Soc. POL'Y IN THE METROPOLIS,
https://www.londonlives.org/static/Reformation.jsp#fnl_6 (last visited May 25,

2022).
105. Clegg, supra note 104, at 348-49.
106. Reformation of Manners Campaigns, supra note 104; see also Clifford S.
Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and
Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 162-63 (1994) (Reformation
of Manners societies used common informers to enforce "temperance and vice"

laws despite criticisms about reliability and the financial incentive). See also id.
at 162 n.467 (citing 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 16 & n.68) (one society hired

full-time informers).
107. See Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 574.
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
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informer."1 1 0 The criticism flowed from informers' motives and the
By holding out private financial
litigation decisions that resulted."1
rewards for litigation victories, legislation permitting popular
enforcement encourages pursuit of private ends in the process of
enforcing the law.112 Informers routinely engaged in self-interested
practices inconsistent with legislative goals and other communal
interests.

1.

113

Technical Violations

The Supreme Court in Hughes Aircraft predicted that qui tam
relators under the FCA would be more likely than government
attorneys to pursue actions premised on "technical noncompliance"
with government reporting requirements that did not really harm the
Treasury.1 1 4 The Court's prediction derived from the premise that qui
tam litigants are "motivated primarily by prospects of monetary
reward rather than the public good."11 5 The problem of "technical"
statutory violations arises from the imprecision of regulatory
language. No legislative body has the foresight and resources to
precisely identify all circumstances in which a statute should
apply. 116 A legislature will often deal with this uncertainty by
framing a statute in general and overinclusive terms. 117
Prosecutorial discretion can soften the impact of an overly broad
statute, allowing a careful selection of cases that advance legislative
goals.1 18 A disinterested public prosecutor can consider the purposes

110. 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 139. Historically, qui tam legislation
often straddled the line between civil and criminal enforcement. See Beck,

English Eradication, supra note 11, at 551-52. Statutes providing for popular
enforcement sometimes gave the litigant a choice between civil and criminal
procedural mechanisms for pursuing a statutory forfeiture. Id. at 552 & n.47.

111.
112.
113.
114.
(1997).
115.
116.

Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 581-82.
See id.
See id. at 110.
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949
Id.
See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 121

("[L]awmakers have limited foresight, legislative time and resources are scarce,
and human language is imprecise. So all laws will, in some applications, seem
overinclusive and underinclusive in relation to their ultimate purposes.").

117. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2001); POSNER, supra note 54, at 845-46 ("[R]ules of law
often are overinclusive; the costs of precisely tailoring a rule to the conduct
intended to be forbidden are prohibitive because of the inherent limitations of

foresight and ambiguities of language.").
118.

POSNER, supra note 54, at 846 ("Discretionary nonenforcement is a

technique by which the costs of overinclusion can be reduced without a
corresponding increase in under inclusion (loopholes).").
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behind an enactment and decline to pursue cases that arguably fall
within the statutory language, but have minimal relevance to the
problems the legislature sought to address. 119 Popular legislation, on
the other hand, empowers private informers to pursue claims that fall
within broad statutory language, whether or not a disinterested
prosecutor would believe the litigation advances legislative purposes
or serves the common good. 120 For a private informer, the decision
whether to file a qui tam or popular action may be driven less by
concern for accomplishing legislative goals or advancing common
interests than by the perceived likelihood that the action could
generate a profitable payout.121
The False Claims Act offers a good example of a broadly drafted
statute enforceable through qui tam litigation. 122 Qui tam relators
frequently assert FCA claims that government attorneys would be
unlikely to pursue. 123 For instance, relators may sue based on
allegedly false documentation submitted by a defendant in the course
of carrying out a government contract, but struggle to show that
alleged misrepresentations were "material" to the government's
decision to pay claims. 124 In United States ex rel. Bachert v. Triple
Canopy, Inc., 125 the defendant contracted to provide security services
One
to the United States Department of State worldwide. 126
assignment within the scope of the contract involved security for the
U.S. embassy in Baghdad. 127 The relator was a senior armorer
responsible for inspection and maintenance of over 1,700 weapons
stockpiled at the embassy. 128 While stationed at the embassy, the
relator complained about a fellow armorer who allegedly failed to
The State
properly inspect weapons or record inspections. 129

119.

Cf. id. at 847-48 ("[T]he agency acts as a rational maximizer, comparing

the expected returns and expected costs of alternative uses of its resources.").

120.

See Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 628.

121.

POSNER, supra note 54, at 845 (in system of private enforcement, "all laws

would be enforced that yielded a positive expected net return").
122. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3333.
123. Cf. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE
CLAIMS
ACT
AND
RELATED
FEDERAL
STATUTES,
11
(2021),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R40785.pdf (noting that "the government" may

intervene in qui tam litigation and "is likewise free to move to dismiss or settle
the litigation over the objections of the relator").
124. See generally Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002-04 (2016) (discussing materiality requirement
under FCA).
125. 321 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Va. 2018).
126. Id. at 617.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Department investigated and sought some corrective action but did
not withhold payments under the contract. 1 30
After leaving the defendant's employment, the relator filed a
lawsuit claiming that he had experienced retaliatory employment
actions as a result of his whistle-blowing activity. 131 He also alleged
that the defendant had violated the FCA by creating inaccurate
weapon inspection records to support contractual payments. 132 The
District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
FCA claim, finding that the allegedly inaccurate records maintained
by the relator's co-employee were not material in the context of the
overall contract. 133 The contract provided for the defendant to
perform numerous security-related tasks around the globe. 134 The
inspection records of a single armorer in a single location played a
very small role in relation to the overall contractual performance.135
Therefore, "[n]o reasonable factfinder could conclude that these types
of minor missteps in a small number of inspections, even assuming
they occurred, would have impacted the government's decision to pay
defendant under the Base Contract." 136 The court relied on Supreme
Court precedent indicating that materiality "cannot be found where
noncompliance is minor or insubstantial." 137 The entry of summary
judgment on materiality was bolstered by the fact that the State
Department had investigated the relator's allegations concerning his
co-employee and had never withheld payment or requested a

refund. 138
It would be hard to imagine government attorneys pursuing an
FCA claim based on allegedly inaccurate records like those at issue
in Bachert. At any given time, the Department of Justice is
investigating hundreds of leads concerning people who may have
submitted false or fraudulent claims violating the FCA.139 In deciding
which cases to pursue, the government will presumably seek to deploy
resources efficiently, prioritizing cases based on factors like the
130. Id.
131. Id. at 616.
132. See id. at 617.
133. Id. at 619-21.
134. Id. at 617.
135. Id. at 619-20.
136. Id. at 620.
137. Id. at 619 (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016)).
138. Id. at 621.
139. In fraud statistics maintained by the Civil Division of the Department of
Justice, the Department indicates that there were 922 new matters in Fiscal Year
2020, 250 not connected with qui tam actions, and 672 arising from qui tam
filings. See FRAUD STATISTICS - OVERVIEW: OcT. 1, 1986 - SEPT. 30, 2020, 2 tbl. 1
(n.d.),
CIVIL
Div.,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUST.,
CIVIL
DIV.,

https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1354316/download.
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quality of the evidence that the statute was violated, the defendant's
culpability, the amount of harm done to the Treasury, and the size of
any potential recovery.
The relator in an FCA qui tam case, on the other hand, has much
less information than the government about potential violations of
the statute. As in Bachert, the relator may be a former employee of a
contractor who has inside information about one particular
government contract. In deciding whether to file an FCA action, the
relator does not have the government's luxury of sifting through a
large volume of potential cases to select those most worthy of
litigation.140 Instead, the relator must work with the facts in his
possession. The relator may perceive personal benefits from filing
even a technical or tenuously supported FCA claim, however, because
it could have settlement value or could be abandoned in exchange for
a higher settlement on another cause of action like the relator's
141
employment-related claim in Bachert.
2.

Inducing Statutory Violations

Informers in popular actions have often been accused of seeking
to bring about violations of a statute, through deception or trickery,
so that they can sue for the penalty. 142 Judge Posner points out that
a system of private enforcement incentivizes the informer to increase
"his 'catch,' and hence his income, by augmenting the supply of
'offenders."' 143 The legislature adopts a penal statute in order to
suppress conduct deemed harmful, but an informer's financial
interests can be furthered by encouraging individuals to commit

statutory violations. 144

Private prosecutors can be found attempting to encourage
violations of the law in the context of eighteenth-century English
efforts to suppress theft and other property crimes. 145 Parliament
passed a number of statutes that offered rewards for successful
146
prosecution of specified crimes, starting with highway robbery.

140. Cf. POSNER, supra note 54, at 848 (discussing how agencies weigh legal
merits and litigation costs in deciding which cases to pursue).
141. Cf. Tycko & Zavareei Whistleblower Prac. Grp., What Is a Qui Tam
Relator?,
NAT'L
L.
REv.
(Feb.
16,
2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-qui-tam-relator

("When

fraud-

committing organizations seek to retaliate despite the protections provided by
the FCA, [an employee] ha[s] the right to bring a lawsuit against [the] employer
for termination.").

142.

See Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 633-34.

143.

POSNER, supra note 54, at 843.

144. Id.
145.

See J.M. BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800, at

(1986).
146. Id. at 51-52.
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When crime rates rose, statutory rewards were sometimes
These
temporarily increased by government proclamation. 147
statutes and proclamations created even greater incentives for
private prosecution than legislation creating standard qui tam or
popular actions because the reward money was paid by the
government rather than the less certain prospect of securing a share
of money or property from the defendant. 148 Groups of merchants,
crime victims, or others might raise the financial inducement for
prosecutions even higher by offering additional rewards to
149
supplement those available from the government.
The money available for successful criminal prosecutions
inspired a cohort of "thief-takers," who tracked down and prosecuted
alleged thieves in order to win public and private bounties. 150 The
financial incentives ironically spurred unsavory efforts to increase
the number of thefts committed. 15 1 Thief-takers were "commonly

147. Id. at 52-53.
148. One can draw procedural distinctions between standard qui tam statutes
for recovery of a penalty and statutes addressing more serious criminal activity.
Penal actions filed under qui tam statutes "were usually summary proceedings

heard before Justices of the Peace, without a jury." Douglas Hay, Prosecution
and Power: Malicious Prosecution in the English Courts, 1750-1850, POLICING
AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, at 354 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder
eds., 1989). More serious crimes were also prosecuted by private prosecutors in
eighteenth-century England but involved grand jury indictment and trial by jury.

See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906) ("Under the ancient English system,
criminal prosecutions were instituted at the suit of private prosecutors, to which

the King lent his name in the interest of the public peace and good order of
society. In such cases the usual practice was to prepare the proposed indictment
and lay it before the grand jury for their consideration."), overruled on other

grounds, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 65-77
(1964); see generally John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century
Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1983)
(discussing the interaction of magistrates, private prosecutors, and juries in
eighteenth-century English criminal trials).
For purposes of this Article,
however, a statute offering a reward for conviction of a serious crime creates the
same potential for conflict between the financial interests of the private
prosecutor and the public interest in just and impartial enforcement of the laws.
See also 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 146; Ruth Paley, THIEF-TAKERS IN
LONDON IN THE AGE OF THE MCDANIEL GANG, C. 1745-1754, POLICING AND
PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750-1850, at 327 ("[T]here can be little doubt left that
the everyday business of the London thief-taker amounted to nothing less than a
systematic manipulation of the administration of the criminal law for personal

gain.").
149.

BEATTIE, supra note 145, at 53-54.

150. See generally id. at 55-59 (discussing thief-takers); Paley, supra note
148, at 303-10 (discussing backgrounds of a number of thief-takers operating in
London).
151.

See, e.g., BEATTIE, supra note 145, at 56.
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accused of being thief-makers" who "enticed naive young thieves into
committing offenses in order to prosecute them and collect the reward
A particularly elaborate case of entrapment was
money." 152
perpetrated by a gang of five conspirators, including a well-known
thief-taker named Stephen Macdaniel. 153 A contemporary newspaper
account explains the scheme:
One of [the five conspirators, named Blee] was to seduce two
persons into a robbery on the highway, in which, to prevent
suspicion, he was to be an accomplice; another of them was to
be the person robbed; a third was to buy the stolen goods of the
thieves; a fourth [Macdaniel] was to seize them as an officer;

and the fifth was to join the rest in the prosecution. He that had
assisted to commit the robbery [Blee] was to escape, the [robbers
recruited by Blee] were to be hanged, and the gang were to share
154
the reward.

The conspirators arranged for the theft to take place in an area where
residents had offered an additional £20 reward beyond the statutory
bounty established by Parliament. 155 The two young men duped into
carrying out the robbery were found guilty. 156
The scheme unraveled when a constable captured Blee and then
accused Macdaniel and the other conspirators of being "accessories
before the fact" who had planned the whole "robbery." 157 Macdaniel
and his crew had reportedly collected £1,720 from the government for
prior convictions obtained at the Old Bailey alone.1 58 Corrupt thieftakers like Macdaniel cast doubt on the efforts of better-intentioned
crime fighters, including the "Bow Street" informers who worked with
magistrates to enforce the law. 159

152. Id.; see also Paley, supra note 148, at 323.
153. See An Account of Stephen Macdaniel, John Berry, James Egan, andJames
Salmon, Tried as Accessories in Procuringthe Said Salmon to Be Robbed by Peter
Kelly and John Ellis; and ofBlee, Their Accomplice and Accuser, Mar. 3, 1755,
SCOTS MAG., 120-26 [hereinafter An Account of Stephen Macdaniel], for a
comprehensive, contemporary account of the conspiracy.
154. Id. at 120; see also London, DERBY MERCURY, Feb. 27-Mar. 5, 1756, at 3.
155. An Account of Stephen Macdaniel, supra note 153, at 121; London, supra
note 154, at 3.
156. London, supra note 154, at 3; Paley, supra note 148, at 302.
157. See An Account of Stephen Macdaniel, supra note 153, at 124-25;
London, supra note 154, at 3; Paley, supra note 148, at 302.
158. An Account of Stephen Macdaniel, supra note 153, at 125.
159. BEArrIE, supra note 145, at 56; Langbein, supra note 148, at 113-14
(Magistrate John Fielding "was concerned that the scandal would taint his Bow
Street force, which also lived in part from reward money").
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False and Malicious Accusations

Another common complaint against informers is that they
1 60
Judge Posner
sometimes lodge false or malicious accusations.
pays the
typically
notes that a scheme of private enforcement
guilt or
actual
the
informer "per offender convicted, regardless of
161
another
consider
To illustrate the point,
innocence of the accused."
Stephen
thief-taker
scheme carried out by eighteenth-century
Macdaniel and his co-conspirators. 16 2 Macdaniel's companion Blee
recruited a porter named Joshua Kiddon, concocting a story about a
gentleman who would pay for help in surreptitiously moving some
goods at night.16 3 Blee left Kiddon at a public house in Edmonton and
164
As Blee
then returned later to say that the job had been postponed.
secretly
was
who
a
woman
saw
and Kiddon returned to London, they
working with Macdaniel's gang. 165 Blee suggested that they rob the
woman, but Kiddon steadfastly refused. 166 Blee later returned,
claiming he had robbed the woman himself and offering Kiddon half
of the money, but Kiddon again refused. 167 Kiddon was subsequently
apprehended by Macdaniel the thief-taker and falsely accused of
168
holding a knife to the woman's throat while Blee robbed her.
Kiddon was prosecuted and convicted of participating in a robbery
and was put to death, while Macdaniel and his companions collected
Macdaniel and his accomplices were
the statutory reward. 169
Kiddon through perjury, but the
murdering
subsequently convicted of
on lesser charges. 170
sentenced
were
they
and
judgment was stayed
Convictions for perjury have been obtained with respect to
informers pursuing popular actions under various statutes. One
historian studied cases enforcing the turnpike laws, which limited the
number of horses that could pull a wagon on a turnpike and allowed
17 1
Several
an informer to seize any horses beyond the legal limit.
"horse-taker" informers were convicted of perjury and sentenced to
the pillory, imprisonment, or transportation. 1 72 As we will see below,

160.

See Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 581-83, 598-99.

161.

POSNER, supra note 54, at 843.

162. See An Account of Stephen Macdaniel, supra note 153, at 125-26, for the
portion of the Scots Magazine article dealing with this scheme.
163. Id. at 125.
164. Id. at 125-26.
165. Id. at 126.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 125, 126. The account concludes, "Thus have several innocent men
lost their lives for sham robberies." Id. at 126.
170. Paley, supra note 148, at 334-35.
171. See Hay, supra note 148, at 356.
172. Id. at 358.

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

578

[Vol. 57

false accusations became a particular problem with popular
enforcement of the Gin Act 1736.173 Magistrates John and Henry
Fielding thought informers' reputation for perjury and other forms of
corruption made them poor witnesses and hindered their usefulness
for law enforcement. 174
4. Abusive Litigation Tactics
Informers pursuing qui tam or other popular actions have
sometimes engaged in abusive litigation tactics designed to compel
settlements by making it burdensome for the defendant to mount a
defense. 175 Sir Edward Coke highlighted informers' practice of filing
all actions at Westminster regardless of where the statutory violation
allegedly took place. 176 The costs of traveling to London and waiting
for trial were too high for some defendants, who felt pressure to
submit to informers' settlement demands. 177 In 1587, Parliament
took a limited step toward reform, allowing defendants in certain
cases to make their initial appearance through an attorney. 17 8 Two
years later, Parliament offered greater protection to defendants,
providing that a popular action could only be filed in the county where
the offense was committed. 179
A nineteenth-century communication from London sheriffs to a
parliamentary committee describes another abusive tactic informers
used to force settlements under a statute against illegal insurance. 180
The informer would sue out a writ of capias, resulting in arrest of the
defendant, and claim several penalties "to prevent the possibility of
procuring bail without the consent of the Plaintiff or his Attorney." 181
The informer would then demand a sizable payment from the
defendant as the price to consent to release, at which point the case
would no longer be prosecuted. 182 The arrests would often take place
on a Saturday evening so that the defendant would remain in custody
on Sunday, increasing the likelihood of a compromise. 18 3

173.
174.

175.

See infra Subpart II.A.
3 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 26.
See, e.g., Beck, English Eradication,supranote 11, at 583 (filing cases in

inconvenient fora).

176.

Id.; COKE, supra note 93, at *192.

177. Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 583; MARGARET GAY DAVIES,
THE ENFORCEMENT OF ENGLISH APPRENTICESHIP: A STUDY IN APPLIED

MERCANTILISM 1563-1642, at 27 (1956).
178. An Act for the Continuance and Perfecting of Divers Statutes 1587, 29
Eliz. c. 5, § 21.
179. An Act Concerning Informers 1589, 31 Eliz. c. 5, § 2.
180. 2 RADzINowicz, supra note 33, at 149.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Id.
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Payments to Suppress Litigation

Informers have often been accused of "blackmail" or "extortion"
for collecting informal payments from regulated parties to
184
Professor
discontinue pending actions or refrain from filing suit.

Radzinowicz reports, for instance, that numerous people and
businesses in nineteenth-century London and other cities made
regular "hush money" payments to informers in order to "keep them
sweet." 185 Parliament identified secret settlements as a problem early
in the history of qui tam legislation, punishing informers who entered
into "compositions" with defendants without a license from the
court.186
Hush money payments and unlicensed settlements can diverge
from the public interest in different ways. Qui tam statutes typically
provide for an informer to split any money recovered with the
government, but unlicensed compositions often resulted in the
informer keeping any payment without sharing it with the
government. 187 Secret payments to informers might be smaller than
the forfeiture imposed by statute, reducing the legislature's intended
deterrent impact. Moreover, a secret settlement can allow illegal
activity to continue when public disclosure might cause statutory
Two witnesses before a nineteenth-century
violations to cease.
argued that informers sometimes allowed
committee
parliamentary
with impunity "by buying off the
law
the
break
to
people
188
information."
6.

Delaying Litigation

Judge Posner notes that a private enforcer who learns of someone
preparing to commit a crime has an incentive to wait until the crime
is completed if the penalty for prosecution would be greater than the
penalty associated with prosecuting an attempt. 189 In the same vein,
informers have sometimes delayed litigation in order to increase the
size of a potential bounty. 190 An anonymous nineteenth-century

184.

E.g., Zimmerman, supra note 106, at 159; see id. at 147 (informers "could

reap a remarkably abundant harvest, either from the penalties appointed by the

legislature or by means of their own technique of blackmail and extortion"); Beck,
English Eradication,supra note 8, at 580-81 (discussing transaction cost-based
rationale of informers' conduct).
185. 2 RADZINoWICz, supra note 33, at 150-51; see also Zimmerman, supra

note 106, at 159.
186. Beck, English Eradication,supranote 11, at 587.
187. See id. at 580-81.
188.
189.

2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 153.
POSNER, supra note 54, at 843.

190.

See Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 634-35.
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pamphleteer alleged that informers in many cases "would rather
nurse the criminal than check the crime." 191
A modern FCA case potentially involving intentional delay by an
informer is United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General
Electric Co.192 The relator met with a lawyer midway through 1987,
using an assumed name, to discuss an ongoing scheme to submit false
claims to the United States in connection with a military aid contract
benefitting a foreign government.1 93 In July 1989, the relator
returned to the law firm, revealed his true identity, and supplied
documents supporting the claims of fraud.1 94 The qui tam complaint
was filed in November 1990, roughly three weeks after a foreign
general allegedly involved in the fraud was arrested on unrelated
charges.1 95 In the three and a half years between the relator's first
meeting with his attorney and the time suit was filed, the total
amount of false claims submitted to the U.S. government grew from
$13.1 million to $41.6 million.1 96 General Electric claimed that the
relator's law firm had coached him on procrastinating and evading
requirements of the contractor's regulatory compliance policy.1 97
Reviewing an award of attorney's fees, the Sixth Circuit remanded so
the trial court could "resolve the parties' conflicting claims over
whether the relators' delay in filing their action was aimed at
'running up costs' and at increasing the prospective bounty."1 98
7.

Collusive Litigation

As noted previously, there is one additional way in which
personal interests of informers have conflicted with interests of the
public.1 99 Early in the English experiment with popular enforcement,
Parliament identified a problem of collusion between informers and
regulated parties. 200 A person who violated a statute would agree
with a friendly informer to bring an action. 20 1 The informer would
then sign a release or take the case to judgment, presumably without
actually collecting the bulk of the forfeiture provided by statute. 202
The release or judgment would then be pled as a defense to any later

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

2 RADZINOwICZ, supra note 33, at 152.
41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1037.
Id.

199.

See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.

200.
201.
202.

Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 574.
Id.
See id.

Id.
Id. at 1038-39.
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1044.
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qui tam action arising from the same facts. 203 Parliament responded
with legislation barring a commoner from granting a release in a
popular action and denying effect to a prior recovery tainted by
collusion. 204
II. POPULAR ENFORCEMENT OF CONTROVERSIAL LEGISLATION: TWO
CASE STUDIES

Legislation authorizing popular enforcement allows informers to
pursue financial gain or other personal agendas while representing
the communal interest in enforcing the law. Any scheme permitting
popular actions will generate conflicts between public and private
interests. The consequences of the conflict may prove less troubling,
however, when informers are enforcing a statute with broad public
support. For instance, the False Claims Act in this country deputizes
qui tam relators to discover and pursue claims against persons
allegedly defrauding the government. 2 05 Supporters of the FCA's qui
tam enforcement mechanism can argue that any downsides of popular
enforcement are outweighed by the capacity of private relators to
206
disclose fraudulent behavior that would otherwise remain hidden.
In the lucrative world of government contracting, one may reasonably
conclude that the risk of unmeritorious qui tam suits is a cost of doing
by
borne
easily
one
government,
the
with
business
provide
that
companies
large
the
contractors-particularly
government-funded health care services or manufacture weapons
systems for the military.
On occasion, however, popular enforcement has been deployed in
regulatory fields where government intervention is more
controversial and public opinion divided. In these contexts, reliance
upon volunteer law enforcement by self-interested bounty hunters
Popular
can exacerbate the pre-existing political conflict.
enforcement of controversial legislation may generate public
sympathy for those targeted by informers and undermine respect for
the law. 207 We will see these dynamics play out in the English history
surrounding enforcement of the Gin Act 1736 ("Gin Act") and in
twentieth-century popular enforcement of the Sunday Observance
Act 1780 ("Sunday Observance Act"). 208
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
206. Senator Howard explained selection of qui tam enforcement in the False
Claims Act as implementing a policy of "setting a rogue to catch a rogue." Beck,
English Eradication, supra note 11, at 556 n.64 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863)).
207. See infra Subpart II.A.5.
208. See generally History of London: 18th Century Gin Craze, HIsT.,
https://web.archive.org/web/20151001175716/http://www.history.co.uk/study-
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The Gin Act 1736

The English Societies for the Reformation of Manners 209 that
sprung up near the end of the seventeenth century eventually ceased
operations, but the religious impulse toward social reform (including
suppression of vice) would re-emerge in various forms in the decades
that followed. 210 Thomas Bray, founder of the Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge ("SPCK'), partnered with James Oglethorpe in
pressing for prison reform and suggested to Oglethorpe the plan of
establishing Georgia as a colony where English debtors could build a
new life. 211 Magistrate John Fielding, Methodist preacher John
Wesley, and others were involved in renewed efforts to counter
Sabbath-breaking, swearing, gambling, and prostitution, relying on
both education and litigation. 212 William Wilberforce played a
leading role in the movement to abolish the slave trade and also
helped found the Proclamation Society Against Vice and Immorality,
seeking to implement a proclamation issued by King George 111.213
A coalition came together in the 1730s around the view that
England's working classes had succumbed to excessive drinking, with
adverse consequences for the country. 214 London was said to be home
to 1,500 distillers, a reflection of rising demand. 2 15 Gin had become
popular among the working classes due in part to a price advantage
over beer and ale, which were subject to greater regulation and higher

(discussing historical context
topics/history-of-london/18th-century-gin-craze
behind Gin Acts); Christopher Lane, The Striking History of Britain's Sunday
Law, HUFFPOST: BLOG (Mar. 11, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/britain-

sunday-observance-law-striking-history b_1184586
context for the Sunday Observance Acts).
209.
210.

(discussing

historical

See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
See Reformation of Manners Campaigns, supra note 104 (explaining

that the Societies "disappeared from the historical record in 1738").
211. See Peter Clark, The "Mother Gin" Controversy in the Early Eighteenth
Century, 38 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. Soc'Y 63, 74-75 (1988).
212. See Reformation of Manners Campaigns, supra note 104.
As
213. ANNE STOTT, WILBERFORCE: FAMILY AND FRIENDS 33 (2012).
Wilberforce once wrote, "God Almighty has set before me two great objects; the
suppression of the slave trade and the reformation of manners." M.J.D ROBERTS,
MAKING ENGLISH MORALS: VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND MORAL REFORM IN

ENGLAND, 1787-1886, at 17 (2004). Wilberforce's Clapham community became a
driving force behind a variety of social reform efforts. See Russell Smandych, "To
Soften the Extreme Rigor of Their Bondage" James Stephen's Attempt to Reform
the Criminal Slave Laws of the West Indies, 1813-1833, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 537,
538 (2005) ("[T]he famous Evangelical 'Clapham Sect' ... took a leading role in
promoting a number of different humanitarian and social reform causes in the
first half of the nineteenth century.").

214.

See generally Clark, supra note 211 (discussing historical context for this

coalition).

215. Id. at 64.
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taxes. 2 16 Middlesex and Westminster magistrates played a key role
in pressing for suppression of distilled liquors, seeing close
connections among consumption of gin, poverty, and criminal
218
Sir
activity. 2 17 Grand juries called attention to the problem.
Joseph Jekyll, with support from Church of England bishops, lobbied
Queen Caroline on the consequences of the gin trade. 219 Jekyll,
known for his interest in the welfare of the working classes, became
the chief sponsor of legislation to address the problem in
Parliament. 220 Leading figures in the SPCK circulated literature on
the dangers of gin, though one bishop warned that the campaign was
a distraction from the group's core evangelical and educational
mission. 221

In response to these lobbying efforts, Parliament adopted "[a]n
Act for laying a Duty upon the Retalers of Spirituous Liquors, and for
licensing the Retalers thereof." 222 The preamble recited the concerns
prompting Parliament to act:
[T]he drinking of Spirituous Liquors or Strong Waters is become
very common, especially among the People of lower and inferior
Rank, the constant and excessive Use whereof tends greatly to
the Destruction of their Healths, rendering them unfit for useful
Labour and Business, debauching their Morals, and inciting
them to perpetrate all Manner of Vices; and the ill
Consequences of the excessive Use of such Liquors are not
confined to the present Generation, but extend to future Ages,
223
and tend to the Devastation and Ruin of this Kingdom.

The "dramatic and draconian" provisions of the Gin Act "threatened
to close down the spirits trade overnight." 224 Professor Radzinowicz
noted that the legislation "almost amounted to the prohibition of all
225
alcoholic liquors, at a time when drinking was particularly rife."
The Gin Act contained a number of regulations concerning sale
of distilled liquors, including a duty of twenty shillings per gallon,
accompanied by penalties for failure to comply. 226 Two provisions of
the Gin Act generated the most litigation. First, establishments that
wished to sell "spirituous liquors" in retail quantities were required
216. Id. at 65.
217. See id. at 67, 73.
218. Id. at 71.
219. Id. at 67.
220. See id. at 75-76.
221. Id. at 74.
222. An Act for Laying a Duty upon the Retalers of Spiritous Liquors, and for
Licensing the Retalers Thereof 1736, 9 Geo. 2 c. 23 [hereinafter Gin Act 1736].
223. Id. § 1.
224. Clark, supra note 211, at 63.
225.

2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 147.

226. Gin Act of 1736, supranote 222, §§ 3, 11, 15.
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to purchase a £50 annual license. 227 A person who sold distilled liquor
in quantities less than two gallons without first getting the license
was subject to a forfeiture of £100 that could be sought in an action
before the Commissioners of Excise. 228 The penalty was enforceable
by qui tam action, with the money divided "one Moiety" (half) to the
king "and the other Moiety thereof to the Person or Persons who shall
inform or sue for the same." 229 A license could only be issued to
someone who kept an inn or other establishment devoted to sale of
food or drink. 230 The licenses were too expensive for profitable retail
operation, and only a small number were sold over the life of the
statute. 231 Thousands of shopkeepers decided to risk the penalties of
the Gin Act by continuing to engage in retail sales of distilled liquors
without purchasing a license. 23 2
The second heavily litigated provision of the statute sought to
penalize hawkers who sold distilled spirits in streets, fields, sheds,
233
wheelbarrows, or other places ineligible for issuance of a license.
The penalty was £10 for this offense, with half payable to the qui tam
234
An
informer and the other half for the use of the poor of the parish.
action under this section of the statute could be tried before any
Justice of the Peace with jurisdiction where the offense was
committed. 235 The statute provided that any person convicted under
the hawking provision who would not or could not pay the £10
forfeiture would be imprisoned with hard labor for two months. 236
Deploying qui tam informers to enforce the Gin Act ultimately
undermined the legislation. The informers' personal interests led to
various litigation abuses. 237 As informers' misconduct multiplied and
accounts of their activities circulated, public opinion turned decisively
against the statute, making it unenforceable. 238 As one historian has
argued, "[t]o employ informers in such a controversial matter as the
239
Gin Act was to court disaster."

227.
228.
211, at
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. § 1.
See id. §§ 2, 4; Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 303; Clark, supra note
79.
See Gin Act 1736, supra note 222, § 5.
See id. § 10.
Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 303.
See id. at 303--04; Clark, supra note 211, at 79.
See Gin Act 1736, supra note 222, § 13.
Id.
Id.; see Clark, supra note 211, at 79.
Gin Act 1736, supra note 222, § 13.
See Clark, supra note 211, at 80.
Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 81.
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ProcuringStatutory Violations

The fact that thousands of gin sellers continued operating
without purchasing the statutorily required license suggests that
many sellers had a base of trusted customers who maintained
silence. 240 Any of those customers could potentially make some
money by filing an information disclosing the illegal sales. But the
rewards of informing were uncertain in the absence of cooperating
witnesses or corroborating evidence. 24 1 Moreover, the strategy could
work only one time, and the attempt would incur negative social and
reputational consequences. 242 Informers, therefore, had to figure out
ways to convince gin sellers to serve people outside their circle of loyal
customers.

One common strategy among informers was to play on the
sympathies of suspected gin merchants by feigning illness or claiming
they needed gin for someone who was sick. 243 Distilled liquors were
widely recognized as having medicinal value. 2 4 4 The Gin Act included
an exemption for doctors and apothecaries who used spirituous
liquors as an ingredient in medicines "for Sick, Lame, or Distempered
persons only." 245 Shortly after the statute went into effect, an
apothecary was convicted before the Commissioners of Excise for
"prescribing to pretended-ailing Patients, nothing but entire Gin,
without any Mixture or Composition." 246 Counsel for the Crown
observed that it appeared to be a "more sickly time," given that more
people than usual were visiting apothecaries. 247 The defendant
replied that "the late Act of Parliament had given many People the
Gripes [i.e., stomach pains] which occasioned a great Laughter in the
Court."248
Informers constructed elaborate ruses in their efforts to dupe
litigation targets into retail sales. 249 One newspaper account tells of
a female informer who went to a barber shop "complaining of
Sickness, and desiring to be reliev'd by bleeding," 250 a medical
procedure provided by barbers at the time. After receiving the

240. Cf. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 303-04 (noting that per capita
consumption dropped only temporarily after the Gin Act 1736 passed).

241. Id. at 308-09.
242. Id. at 309.
243. Id. at 308; see London, STAMFORD MERCURY, Mar. 2, 1738, at 2 (two
women on temporary release from prison assisted informers by feigning illness
so "unwary People" would serve them spirituous liquors).
244. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 325 n.57.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Gin Act 1736, supra note 222, § 12.
Wye's Letter, CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Edinburgh), Oct. 26, 1736, at 1.
London, DERBY MERCURY, Oct. 28, 1736, at 2.
Id.
Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 307-09.
London, DERBY MERCURY, Dec. 21, 1738, at 1.
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"puncture" from the barber, the informer feigned a fainting spell and
requested some spirits to assist in the recovery. 251 The barber
brought her a dram, for which she paid. 252 She then declared how
helpful it had been and asked for another, which was brought by the
barber's wife, occasioning a second payment. 253 Since both the barber
and his wife had violated the statute, they were imprisoned together
for two months, 254 suggesting they either could not or would not pay
the forfeiture provided by statute.
In another scheme, two women entered an alehouse. 255 One
pretended to be pregnant in order to "dr[aw] compassionate persons
in," so they would sell her liquor and she could inform against
them. 256 The two women went to a Middlesex Justice of the Peace to
charge the owner of the alehouse, who happened to be the
magistrate's neighbor. 257 A search of the "pregnant" informer
revealed a cushion under her clothing. 258 The magistrate was
compelled to convict the defendant, who paid £5 to the informer, but
the other £5 payment for the parish poor was waived. 259 While the
informer collected her bounty, the magistrate also had her
incarcerated as a "cheat."260
Some litigation targets managed to avoid the attempted
deceptions of informers. One apothecary believed a woman who
pretended sickness and requested some spirits, but refused to accept
any payment. 26 1 The woman informed nevertheless, leading the
magistrate to have her committed to prison. 262 On another occasion,
a female merchant suspected dishonesty when an informer requested
gin for his "very sick" wife. 263 The woman gave the man a bottle of
vinegar instead. 264 When the informer tried to bring charges, he was
set in the stocks for the affront to the court. 265 A mob took advantage
of the informer's vulnerable position to tar and feather him. 266 Some
particularly cautious gin sellers developed a practice of avoiding all

251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id.
Id.

255.

From Several London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, July 1, 1738, at 1.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

261.

Bagnall's News, IPSWICH GAZETTE, Oct. 15-Oct. 22, 1736, at 4.

262. Id.
263. London, DERBY MERCURY, Oct. 20, 1737, at 1.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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face-to-face interaction with customers. 267 A customer would come to
the entryway of a shop and cry out a password, after which a drawer
would slide into the room through which the customer could pay and
the drink could be served without the customer ever seeing the
merchant.26 8
The newspapers also include accounts of the public looking out
for merchants who were tricked by potential informers. 269 When a
group of eleven diners had eaten at a public house, one claimed to be
suffering from cholic and asked for some brandy. 270 The landlord
talked about the dangers of retailing distilled liquors but,
nevertheless, brought the brandy when the diners promised
secrecy. 271 An argument ensued when the diners suggested they
might inform against the landlord, and a crowd took the landlord's
side, managing to dunk seven of the eleven individuals in the river. 2 72
On another occasion, an inebriated man procured a vial of gin from a
Mrs. How, allegedly for his sick wife. 273 He then told three or four
The
acquaintances of his plan to inform on Mrs. How. 274
acquaintances reportedly managed to distract the informer long
enough to drink the gin and replace it with a bodily substance the
judges found less than amusing. 278
2.

False and FraudulentAccusations

English newspapers contain numerous accounts of false
accusations by informers seeking penalties under the Gin Act. In one
instance, a well-dressed man ordered some ale at an inn operated by
a widow. 276 He asked the innkeeper if she could give or sell him some
brandy. 277 The woman reportedly indicated that she could not sell
the man any brandy but identified a cupboard where he could find a
bottle. 278 The man poured some brandy into his ale and also poured
an extra half-pint into a vial that he put in his pocket. 279 On his way
out, he told the woman he wanted to pay her six pence extra because
of her "extraordinary civilities." 28 0 He then went directly to a

267. London, STAMFORD MERcURY, Feb. 23, 1738, at 2.
268. Id.
269.

London, DERBY MERCURY, July 28, 1737, at 4.
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271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.

Id.
Id.
From Wye's and other Letters, NEWCASTLE COURANT, Aug. 27, 1737, at 1.
Id.
Id.
From Several London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, Jan. 15, 1737, at 2.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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magistrate to file an information against the widow for illegally
selling distilled liquor. 2 81 The magistrate called for the widow and,
when it came out that the man took the vial of brandy without the
widow's knowledge, sent the informer to jail and bound the widow
282
over to prosecute him.

On another occasion, nine informers were heard by people in an
283
adjoining room of a public house plotting to lodge false accusations.
Those who overheard the plan went and warned the magistrate. 284
When the informers arrived and made their accusations, the
defendants were called and denied having seen the informers
previously. 285 The judge concluded the accusations were a "base and
2 88
scandalous contrivance" and committed the informers to prison.
Many of the newspaper accounts involve a simple financial
motive for a false accusation, but there is occasionally more to the
story. One account involved an accusation against a Mr. Ballard for
retailing liquor in vidlation of the statute. 287 At trial, Mr. Ballard
denied the charge and alleged that the information was filed out of
spite. 288 He was a creditor of the informer's husband.289 When he
asked to be repaid, he was told that he would be paid with his own
money. 290 Mr. Ballard initiated legal proceedings to collect the debt,
at which point the debtor's wife sought revenge by accusing him of
violating the Gin Act. 2 91 This defense was proved to the satisfaction
of the court, and Mr. Ballard was acquitted of retailing distilled
liquors. 292
One study of a sample of cases under the Gin Act found thirtyone informers indicted for perjury, of whom seventeen were
convicted. 293 Even without an indictment or conviction for perjury,
perceptions of informers' truthfulness could influence proceedings
under the statute. On one occasion, the Commissioners of Excise
dismissed informations against sixteen individuals and severely

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. London, STAMFORD MERCURY, Aug. 24, 1738, at 2.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287.

From Several London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, June 24, 1738, at 2.

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 315-16; see also, From Several

London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, Sept. 23, 1738, at 1 (informers convicted of
perjury); London, STAMFORD MERCURY, Dec. 21, 1738, at 2 (woman convicted of
perjury).
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reprimanded the informers. 294 This disposition flowed from the
commissioners' conclusion that the informers' "only View was to get
Money" and that they had previously "convicted great Numbers of
innocent People." 295
The significant number of false accusations under the Gin Act
hardened public antipathy toward informers. 296 A particularly
prolific informer named Edward Parker was charged in several
indictments in late 1738 for suborning perjury. 297 Parker was an
exciseman who reportedly coordinated a network of thirty informers
and was responsible for allegations against 1,500 defendants. 298
Before the perjury cases were tried, Parker passed away, possibly by
suicide. 299 He was interred in a private ceremony "for fear the Mob
should tear his Corpse to Pieces."3 00
3.

Extorting Payments for Non-Enforcement

The sizable penalties under the Gin Act created opportunities for
potential informers to coerce payments from merchants fearful of
The study referenced in the previous Subpart
prosecution.3 0 1
discovered nineteen indictments for extortion against informers,
resulting in fourteen convictions. 302 For example, early in 1738, a
constable was convicted of extorting a guinea from a food seller "on
[p]retence of' his violating the statute. 303 Shortly thereafter, the
mayor of London committed several people to jail over the course of
several days "for extorting Money from People to stifle Informations"
for retailing distilled liquors.304
In November of 1741, London merchants became alarmed when
an unfounded rumor circulated that fresh orders had been issued to
resume strict enforcement of the Gin Act. 305 The papers conjectured
that the rumor was circulated by "a Set of Villains," who collected
payments to suppress informations and wanted to induce panic
294. London, IPSWICH J., Mar. 24, 1739, at 23.
295. Id.
296. See generally Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 313 (discussing "popular
protests" responding to the Gin Act 1736 and its effects).
297. From Wye's and Other Letters, NEWCASTLE COURANT, Oct. 21, 1738, at 2;
London, STAMFORD MERcURY, Nov. 16, 1738, at 2.

298.

Clark, supra note 211, at 80; Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 320.

299. From Several London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, Jan. 13, 1739, at 1.
The account reports that Parker took the perjury indictments "much to Heart,

which was the Occasion of his Death." Id.
300. Id.
301.

See generally Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 303-04 (discussing the

fines and the effects of their high amounts).
302. Id. at 316.
303.
304.
305.

London, STAMFORD MERcURY, Mar. 9, 1738, at 1.
From Several London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, May 6, 1738, at 2.
London, STAMFORD MERCURY, Nov. 19, 1741, at 2.
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among targets of their
Commissioners of Excise
payments from merchants
while a fourth member
conspirators.3 07
4.
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A few days later, the
extortion.3 06
dismissed three excisemen for extorting
"under pretense of stifling Informations,"
of the gang testified against his co-

Collusive Actions

A newspaper account from the height of Gin Act enforcement
raises a suspicion of collusion between informers and targets of
litigation. 30 8 One difficulty with the original 1736 legislation was that
it provided inadequate incentives for qui tam actions against lowincome street hawkers. 309 The Gin Act provided for a forfeiture of
£10, which was more than the annual wage for many working-class
citizens at the low end of the London pay scale.31 0 A person who could
not or would not pay was imprisoned for two months. 311 However,
informers had little reason to prosecute low-level gin sellers whose
poverty made recovery of a bounty unlikely. To address the problem,
Parliament enacted legislation in 1737 providing that an informer
who did not receive a £5 payment from a convicted defendant could
be paid by the Commissioners of Excise. 312 The defendant was to be
313
whipped at the end of the period of imprisonment.
A newspaper account shortly after the statutory change reported
that informers were gaining considerable sums by convicting
offenders at the Excise office, but without any reduction in the

306.

Id.

307. Id.; see also London, DERBY MERCURY, Dec. 10, 1741, at 4 (reporting on
dismissal of "a noted Exciseman" who terrorized distillers and was proved to have
received a total of 40 Guineas from several persons under the pretense of stifling

informations that had been lodged against them).
308.

From Wye's Letter, and the London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, July

30, 1737, at 3.
309. See supra notes 233-236 and accompanying text.
310. See Currency, Coinage and the Cost of Living, THE PROCEEDINGS OF OLD
(last visited
BAILEY, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Coinage.jsp#wages

May 28, 2022).
311. Gin Act 1736, supra note 222, § 13.
312. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 306; An Act for Repealing the Present
Duty on Sweets, and for Grating a Less Duty Thereupon; and for Explaining and
Enforcing the Execution of an Act Passed in the Ninth Year of His Present
Majesty's Reign, Intituled, An Act for Laying a Duty upon the Retailers of
SpirituousLiquors, and for Licensing the Retailers Thereof; and for Appropriating
the Supplies Granted in this Session of Parliament; and for Making forth
Duplicates of Exchequer Bills, Lottery Tickets and Orders, Lost, Burnt, or
Otherwise Destroyed 1737, 10 Geo. 2 c. 17, § 9 [hereinafter Gin Act 1737].
313. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 306; Gin Act 1737, supra note 312, § 9
(before being discharged, defendant was to be "stript naked from the Middle
upwards, and whipt until his or her Body be bloody").
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popularity of retail gin sales. 314 The story reported on suspected
collusion between informers and defendants:
'Tis remarked also, that the Informers could not make such
Sums by their Informations, but that they agree with the
Persons prosecuted, who are of the poorer Sort, and are glad of
an Opportunity to share the Premium. It seems this has been
315
concerted ever since the Act passed the Royal Assent.

The suspicion seems to be that some low-income gin sellers might be
willing to undergo prosecution if the informer promised to share part
of the bounty, now paid by the government. The financial reward was
great enough to induce cooperation between informers and hawkers,
even though the defendant might suffer two months in prison and a
Despite the lack of readily
potential whipping before release.
available evidence to this effect, it would not be surprising to learn
that some particularly desperate individuals were actually lured into
the gin trade through collusion with informers. If so, government
payments designed to help suppress the gin trade might actually turn
into a sort of subsidy for street hawking of distilled liquors.
5.

The Demise of the Gin Act 1736

Attempting to shut down an industry supplying a popular and
addictive pastime was inevitably going to be a challenge. But it seems
clear that the large role Parliament gave to qui tam enforcement
contributed significantly to the failure of the Gin Act. In an address
to Parliament, the King complained of "Defiance of all Authority,
Contempt of Magistracy, and even Resistance of the Law." 3 16 Dozens
of informers were assaulted while the act remained in force. 317 One
historian observed that the attacks sometimes took on a ritual
character. Informers were drawn through the mud; one was even
buried in ashes and cinder in a dung hill.318 Some received "the usual
Discipline of Pump and Horse-Pond." 319 At least four informers were

314.

From Wye's Letter, and the London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, July 30,

1737, at 3.
315. Id.
316. See George II, His Majesty's Most Gracious Speech to Both Houses of
Parliament

(June

21,

1737),

in

WELCOME

COLLECTION,

https://wellcomecollection.org/works/xnyjzvgk.
317.

Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 309; Clark, supranote 211, at 80 (after

new Act in 1737, "several informers a month suffered brutal physical assaults").
318.

Clark, supra note 211, at 81.

319. London, N. COUNTRY J. IMPARTIAL INTELLIGENCER (Newcastle upon Tyne,
Tyne and Wear), Aug. 20, 1737, at 2.

592

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

killed, including a female informer. 320 A number of informers were
targeted by press gangs and forced into service in the Royal Navy. 321
Public anger was directed not just at informers, but also at
government officials who heard their cases and enforced the
statute. 322 Constables and other officers seeking to arrest defendants
or enforce judgments were sometimes met with violence. 323 One study
found evidence of at least thirty-six demonstrations that took place in
Westminster from 1736-40, nine of which involved gatherings outside
the place where a case was being tried.324 The researchers classified
seven of the demonstrations as "riots," including three outside the
home of Justice Thomas De Veil, a magistrate particularly active in
hearing cases under the statute. 325 De Veil sought to prosecute Roger
Allen for inciting a riot involving 1,000 participants. 326 The jury
acquitted Allen based on his lawyers' claim of insanity, possibly
intimidated by the large mob that gathered outside Westminster Hall
while Allen was being tried.3 27
Opposition to the Gin Act spread, and some church wardens who
received money for the poor under the statute ended up returning the
funds to retailers who had been convicted. 32 8 The Commissioners of
Excise decided not to hear further claims for retailing spirituous
liquors unless "reputable persons" supported the informer's
character, in order to "prevent innocent Persons from becoming a
Prey to those People who live upon their Spoil." 329 Justices of the
Peace gradually entertained fewer cases under the statute.3 3 0 The
1736 statute had become a dead letter by 1741 and was formally
replaced with less draconian legislation in 1743.331
Hindsight placed blame for failure of the statute on the
enforcement role given to qui tam informers and the public backlash
they provoked. 332 Justice De Veil noted that the statute set loose "a
crew of desperate and wicked people who turn'd informers merely for
320. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 309; see also From Wye's and Other
Letters, NEWCASTLE COURANT, Nov. 12, 1737, at 2 (two informers killed by a mob).
321. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 319-20.
322. See id. at 305.
323. See id. at 310-11; London, N. COUNTRY J. IMPARTIAL INTELLIGENCER
(Newcastle upon Tyne, Tyne and Wear), June 27, 1737, at 1.
324. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 310.

325. Id. at 309; Clark, supra note 211, at 80.
326. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 317.
327. Id.
328. London, DERBY MERCURY, Aug. 10, 1738, at 2; Warner & Ivis, supranote
39, at 315; Clark, supra note 211, at 82.
329.

London, DERBY MERCURY, Apr. 5, 1739, at 1; Warner & Ivis, supra note

39, at 314.
330. Clark, supra note 211, at 82; Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 318-19.
331. Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 306.
332. See id. at 299.
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bread."33 3 Lord Bathurst, in parliamentary debates on replacement
legislation, noted that perjury by informers was "so flagrant and
common, that the people thought all informations malicious, or at
least, thinking themselves oppressed by the law, they looked upon
334
Public
every man that promoted its execution as their enemy."
opposition "wearied the magistrates" and intimidated legitimate
informers so that the law fell into disuse. 335 Ultimately, the Gin Act
failed to maintain "that consensus of acceptance in the country as a
whole which was essential if it was to be enforceable," 336 instead
producing "open contempt for the law" and those who enforced it.337
Twentieth-Century Enforcement of the Sunday Observance Act
Beilby Porteus, bishop of Chester and later bishop of London, was
the highest-ranking Church of England official to support
Wilberforce's efforts to abolish the English slave trade. 338 He was also
the leading supporter of the legislation that became the Sunday
Observance Act. 339 The concerns that led to enactment of the statute
included businesses providing public entertainment on the Sabbath,
but also Sunday debates about Scripture by people untutored in
theology. 340
Under the Sunday Observance Act, any house, room, or place
that charged admission or sold tickets for "public Entertainment or
Amusement" or for "publicly debating on any Subject whatsoever" on
B.

333. MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND TIMES, OF SIR THOMAS DEVEIL, KNIGHT, HIS
MAJESTY'S JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, FOR THE COUNTIES OF MIDDLESEX, ESSEX,
SURRY, AND HERTFORDSHIRE, THE CITY AND LIBERTY OF WESTMINSTER, THE TOWER
OF LONDON, AND THE LIBERTIES THEREOF 39 (1748); Clark, supra note 211, at 80.
334. 2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 147.

335.
336.

Id.
Clark, supra note 211, at 83.

337.

Warner & Ivis, supra note 39, at 320.

338.

Joshua Kellard, Beilby Porteus: Social Reformer, Public Apologist,

https://roundchurchcambridge.org/porteusCAMBRIDGE,
ROUND
CHURCH
reformer-apologist/ (last visited May 28, 2022).
339. Christopher Lane,
Observance

On the Victorian Afterlife of the 1781 Sunday
Act,

BRANCH,

https://www.branchcollective.org/?psarticles=christopher-lane-on-the-victorian-

afterlife-of-the-1781-sunday-observance-act (last visited May 28, 2022). The Act
was proposed in 1780 and enacted in 1781, so references to the statute sometimes
use the latter date. However, we will refer to the statute as the "Sunday
Observance Act 1780," which appears to be the official designation. See Short

Titles Act, 1896, U.K. Stat. 1896, ch. 14, Schedule 1.
340.

An Act for Preventing Certain Abuses and Profanations on the Lord's

Day, Called Sunday, 21 Geo. 3, c. 49, § 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter Sunday Observance
Act 1780]; see also The Common Informer, YORKSHIRE POST, July 18, 1931, at 10
(by concerning theological debates, the act "was a measure of protection for the
Church and the clergy, as well as for the suppression of Sunday entertainments").
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a Sunday was deemed a "disorderly house." 34 1 The act imposed
forfeitures of £200 for the "keeper" of a disorderly house; £100 for a
person serving as master of ceremonies or as moderator of a public
debate; £50 for a doorkeeper or other person collecting money or
promoting forbidden
advertisements
and £50 for
tickets;
342
by any person who
be
collected
could
The forfeitures
gatherings.
would sue for them, 343 making the lawsuit a "popular action" under
Blackstone's classification. 3 4 4 The statute remained in effect through
World War II and beyond, and the activities of common informers
enforcing the statute helped build support for abolishing popular
enforcement in England. 345
1. Millie Orpen and Sunday Cinema
Early in the twentieth century, cinema began to take root in
England as a form of public entertainment. 346 In the Cinematograph
Act of 1909, Parliament empowered local county councils to license
347
the operation of cinemas and impose conditions on those licenses.
In an early case interpreting the statute, a three-judge court
determined that the London County Council ("LCC") had broad power
to impose reasonable conditions on cinema licenses, including
conditions unrelated to public safety. 348 Thus, the LCC was within
its authority to require the cinema to remain closed on Sundays, Good
Friday, and Christmas. 349 Justice Avory noted that similar conditions
had been imposed in licensing music and dance halls and viewed the
restriction as simply requiring the licensee to obey the law with
350
respect to Sunday entertainments.
Over the next two decades, many English jurisdictions
disallowed Sunday cinema. 35 1 The authorities governing London and
certain resort areas, however, came to embrace a more flexible
approach. 35 2 One newspaper account explained that a number of local
authorities assumed the Sunday Observance Act was "nearly
341.
342.
343.
344.

Sunday Observance Act 1780, supra note 340, § 1.
Id. §§ 1, 3.
Id. § 4.
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.

345.

Lane, supra note 339.

346. See Ingrid Jeacle, "Going to the Movies": Accounting and Twentieth
Century Cinema, 22 AccT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 677, 679 (2009).
347. Cinematograph Act 1909, 9 Edw. 7 c. 30, § 2.
348. London Cnty. Council v. Bermondsey Bioscope Co. [1911] 1 KB 445 at
451, 453, 454.
349. Id. at 451-52 (Lord Alverstone, C.J.); id. at 453 (Pickford, J.); id. at 45354 (Avory, J.).
350. Id. at 453-54.
351. Sunday Observance and the Law, DUNDEE COURIER & ADVERTISER, Dec.
5, 1930, at 6.
352. Id.

2022]

POPULAR ENFORCEMENT

595

obsolete" and could be ignored. 353 The LCC developed a set of
conditions under which it would approve an application to operate a
cinema on Sundays, so long as the net profits were donated to an
approved charity. 354
The LCC's practice of allowing Sunday cinema operations seemed
unfair to owners of live theaters and music halls, which were not
shown the same consideration. 355 A change in the law seemed
unlikely. According to a theater industry publication, the head of the
influential Lord's Day Observance Society ("LDOS") had polled
leaders of the three major political parties and received assurances
that none of them intended to introduce legislation to repeal the
Lord's Day Observance Act. 356 The author of the article therefore
suggested a "test action" under the 1780 statute against a cinema
authorized to operate on Sundays, in order to have Sunday cinema
declared illegal and establish parity of treatment between cinemas
and theaters. 357 The author expressed some ambivalence about
seeking to enforce a statute that a judge once called "a wanton and
vexatious interference with the liberty of the subject," but he doubted
that theater managers could "afford to let rival interests consolidate
358
their position," especially given the advent of talking movies.
Theater industry representatives did end up filing a test action
in 1930 in the Divisional Court of the King's Bench, though they
decided to sue the LCC rather than litigate directly against a cinema
operator. 359 The LCC had approved an application filed on behalf of
Streatham Astoria to show movies on Sundays, and the plaintiffs
challenged the LCC action as ultra vires.3 6 0 Counsel for the LCC
represented that the agency had received applications for Sunday
operations from "the vast majority" of cinema halls and had imposed
a uniform set of conditions:
Applications had been granted on the strict conditions that the
class of entertainments given on Sunday was of a healthy,
decent character; that the workers were safe-guarded from
doing an extra day's work; and that there was no question of
private profit made out of the entertainment, but on the
contrary that the profits-ascertained by a scheme of

353.
354.
355.
12.
356.

357.
air and
358.
359.
360.

Id.
Sunday Entertainments,STAGE (London), Dec. 11, 1930, at 20.
See id.; Sunday Cinema Shows, ScOTsMAN (Edinburgh), Dec. 5, 1930, at
Sunday Entertainments,supra note 354, at 20.

See id. ("A test action, the issue of which is not in doubt, would clear the
hasten reform.").
Id.
Id.; Sunday Cinema Shows, supra note 355, at 12.
Sunday Entertainments,supra note 354, at 20.
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accountancy that was clearly laid down-should be handed to a
charity.36 1

According to counsel, roughly £200,000 had been paid to hospitals and
other charities in that year.36 2 The three-judge court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the LCC lacked authority to permit the cinema to
operate on Sundays.36 3 Justice Avory explained that the LCC was
purporting to authorize something expressly forbidden by an act of
Parliament. 36 4 The judges rejected the LCC's technical defense that
the council was not really granting permission to operate on Sundays,
but merely announcing a set of conditions under which it would take
no legal action.36 5
The decision sent immediate shock waves through the London
entertainment community since it implied that all London cinemas
operating on Sundays under licenses from the LCC were in violation
of the Sunday Observance Act.3 66 One newspaper observed that the
decision provoked discussion of an "immensely controversial subject,"
dividing "Puritans" and their opponents, and that "[v]ery strong
feelings are aroused on both sides." 367 The LDOS saw the ruling as a
vindication for their position but also expressed concern that it could
lead to legislative efforts to repeal or weaken the Sunday Observance
statute.3 68 The majority of the LCC voted to pursue an appeal and
seek a meeting with the Home Secretary to discuss the situation, over
the objection of some LCC members who thought the court's decision
was clearly correct. 36 9 The Reverend A.G. Prichard argued that an
appeal would be a waste of money and deemed it delusional to
imagine Parliament might repeal the Lord's Day Observance Act,
since "[r]eligious opinion was strong and united on this matter, while
political opinion was divided." 370
As public officials and cinema executives wrestled with the
implications of the court's decision, an enterprising common informer
361. Id.; Sunday Cinema Shows, supra note 355, at 12. One member of the
LCC explained that while the cinemas had to give up Sunday profits, they still
benefited financially from Sunday operations: "The proprietors spread rents and
Sunday
overhead charges over seven days a week instead of six."

Entertainments,supranote 354, at 20. This suggests that while cinemas donated
Sunday profits, permission to open on Sundays made Monday through Saturday

exhibitions more profitable.
362. Sunday Entertainments, supra note 354, at 20; Sunday Cinema Shows,
supra note 355, at 12.

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Sunday Entertainments, supra note 354, at 20.
Id.
See id.
See Sunday Observanceand the Law, supranote 351, at 6.
Id.
Sunday Cinema Shows, supra note 355, at 12.
Sunday Entertainments, supra note 354, at 20.
Id.
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sprang into action. 371 Four days after the Divisional Court's ruling, a
twenty-three-year-old clerk working for the law firm of Jacques,
Asquith & Jacques, with the help of the firm's principal (and perhaps
only) attorney, signed a deed changing her name from "Millie
Oppenheim" to "Millie Orpen." 372 Two days later, Ms. Orpen filed
popular actions against eight London cinema companies and many
individual members of their boards of directors, claiming penalties
under the Lord's Day Observance Act for Sunday cinema exhibitions
stretching over an extended period. 373 The £195,000 in penalties
Ms. Orpen sought from cinema companies and their directors
amounted to "a fortune," over £14 million in today's currency, or a bit
under $17 million. 374 Ms. Orpen also filed additional claims seeking
penalties

from

newspapers

for

carrying

Sunday

cinema

advertisements. 375
The filing of so many actions under the Sunday Observance
statute provoked curiosity and speculation about the identity and
motivations of the informer who had "declared war" on Sunday
cinema. 376 The Lord's Day Observance Society quickly disclaimed any
knowledge of the informer's identity and denied that they were
directly or indirectly responsible for the litigation. 377 One newspaper
371. See Girl Sues for a Fortune:Could PenaltiesBe Remitted?, NEWS CHRON.
(London), Dec. 15, 1930, at 1 [hereinafter Girl Sues] (Common informer, Millie
Orpen, suing eight cinemas for £195,000).
372. Orpen v. Haymarket Capitol, Ltd. [1931] All ER 360 (KB) at 361-62;
Sunday Cinema Performances, HALIFAX DAILY COURIER & GUARDIAN, Jul. 15,

1931, at 6 (clerk testified that firm's principal was Jacques Cohen, who registered
under the name Jacques, Asquith & Jacques; clerk had never met a Mr. Jacques

or a Mr. Asquith).

Trial testimony identified the date of the name change as

December 8, 1930. The Divisional Court announced its decision on December 4.
See Sunday Observance and the Law, supra note 351, at 6.

373. See Girl Sues, supra note 371, at 1.
374. Id. According to one online inflation calculator, £1 in 1930 was worth
approximately £72.65 in 2022. See CPI Inflation Calculator, 2013 DOLLARS,
https://www.in20l3dollars.com/uk/inflation/1930 (last visited Aug. 3, 2022). By
that metric, Ms. Orpen's claims against cinemas totaled £14,166,750 in today's
currency. Applying a conversion rate of £1 equals $1.1897, from a Western Union

currency conversion site, Ms. Orpen's claims total around $16,854,182.48.
British Pound to US Dollar, WU, https://www.westernunion.com/gb/en/currencyconverter/gbp-to-usd-rate.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).

375.
376.

Sunday Opening, STAGE (London), Dec. 18, 1930, at 17.
See, e.g., Woman's "War" on Sunday Kinemas: Action as Common

Informer, PORTSMOUTH EvENING NEWS, Dec. 12, 1930, at 6; Cinemas to Carry On,
NEWS CHRON. (London), Dec. 13, 1930, at 7 ("mystery surrounds the 'informer,'

Miss Millie Orpen"); id. (mother, who said her name was "Offenheim," would only
say she worked in a city office).

377. Sunday Opening, supra note 375, at 17; see also Girl Cinema Informer,
W. MAIL & S. WALES NEWS, Dec. 13, 1930, at 6 (Sunday Observance societies
"surprised" by qui tam actions).
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noted a rumor that officials might have encouraged Ms. Orpen to file
her actions but thought the more likely motive was financial:
"although the sums she is claiming are enormous and will not be paid,
she may yet make a considerable monetary gain out of the whole
matter." 378 Another journalist also subscribed to the theory that
Orpen was motivated by the hope of collecting enormous sums under
"an old, old law, out of date for years but never repealed." 379 The
controversy over Sunday cinema was one aspect of a much broader
national debate concerning activities appropriate for Sunday. 380 A
recently opened greyhound racing club held its first Sunday meeting
soon after Ms. Orpen filed suit, and 2,000 people showed up at their
track or another nearby. 381 Magistrates in Walsall issued a license
"for what it is worth" for a police band to hold a Sunday fundraising
concert for a children's camp, leading one clerk to worry that the Chief
Constable might have to initiate proceedings under the Sunday
Observance Act against his own officers. 382 The LCC, which had
permitted cinemas to open on Sundays, simultaneously sought to
shut down Sunday boxing matches, already taking place at eight
venues. 383 A boxing ring manager criticized the LCC's decision as a
"terrible interference with the rights of private individuals,"
wondering why people could play golf or tennis or go joy-riding on
Sunday but not watch boxing. 384 Meanwhile, an English vicar
complained from the pulpit about a public authority's decision to open
a golf course for tee times on Sunday mornings. 385 The Reverend Pitt
Bonajee, a pastor in Brighton-which he described as "Babylon-onSea"-considered suing a local cinema as a common informer, though
he indicated that he would not claim the penalties provided under the
Sunday Observance Act. 386 Back in London, Ms. Orpen's filings
apparently did nothing to reduce the number of residents going to
movies on Sundays, 387 but they did work like an accelerant on the
smoldering Sunday opening debate, with the threat of enormous legal

378. Miss Millie Orpen, MUSSELBURGH NEWS, Dec. 19, 1930 at 2.
379.

James Mark, Innocent Occupation of Getting Money, DUNDEE EVENING

TEL., Dec. 23, 1930, at 2.
380. See generally The English Sunday, NEWS CHRON. (London), Dec. 15, 1930,
at 1 (reporting controversies over Sunday cinema, boxing, golf, and dog racing).
381. Sunday at "the Dogs," NEWS CHRON. (London), Dec. 15, 1930, at 1.

382. Sunday Opening, supra note 375, at 17.
383. Sunday Boxing to Stop: Effect on Eight London Halls, NEWS CHRON.
(London), Dec. 15, 1930, at 1.
384. Id.
385. Sunday Golf Protest, NEWS CHRON. (London), Dec. 15, 1930, at 2.
386. Brighton PastorTakes Action, NEWS CHRON. (London), Dec. 15, 1930, at
2.
387. Girl Sues, supra note 371, at 1 (London cinemas open and most of them
full).
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penalties increasing pressure for an expeditious legislative
response. 388
The first of Ms. Orpen's cases to be tried targeted Haymarket
Capitol, Ltd., which operated the Capitol Cinema Theatre, and four
individual members of the company's board of directors. 389 The case
was tried before Justice Rowlatt of the King's Bench, without a jury,
in July 1931. Justice Rowlatt explained that statutes permitting suit
by a common informer "enlisted the motive of private greed" to ensure
an offender is "made to smart" for violating the law. 390 The reference
to "private greed" suggests that the judge understood the action to be
financially motivated but also underscores that the informer's
motives were irrelevant. 39 1
Ms. Orpen sought £5,000 each against the company and the four
individual defendants on the theory that each was a "keeper" of the
cinema where tickets had been sold to the public for Sunday film
exhibitions. 392 The statute made a "keeper" of a "disorderly house"
liable for £200 per offense, and Ms. Orpen sought to establish that the
cinema had violated the statute on twenty-five separate Sundays
between June 22 and December 7, 1930.393 Justice Rowlatt found the
company liable for £5,000, rejecting a technical defense that a
company could not be a "keeper" of a house under the statute. 394 He
was not swayed by the supposed lack of evidence that any customer
who bought a ticket actually entered the cinema, noting that "[i]t
would be a great reflection on the sanity of the persons paying the
money to say that they did not go in." 395 Counsel provoked laughter
by responding that they might not have entered because "they were
stricken in their consciences."3 9 6 While the judge was satisfied that
the company was liable, he dismissed claims against the individual
directors for lack of evidence that any of them had been present or
given orders to open the cinema on any of the Sundays in question. 397
388. See Girl Cinema Informer, supra note 377, at 6 (Members of Parliament
ready to pursue legislative correction if LCC appeal not successful); Sunday
Opening, supra note 375, at 17 (bill introduced in Parliament that would require
written consent of Attorney General for common informers to seek recovery of
penalties).

389. Orpen v. Haymarket Capitol, Ltd. [1931] All ER 360 (KB) at 362.
390. Id. at 361.
391. Id. In a similar vein, the judge speculated that "perhaps" Ms. Orpen
changed her name so she "could more colourably come forward as a champion of
the English Sunday," but concluded that "I have nothing whatever to do with
those circumstances." Id. at 361-62.

392.
393.
394.

See id. at 363-65.
Id. at 361, 364.
Id. at 362-63, 365.

395.

Sunday Cinema Performances,supra note 372, at 6.

396.
397.

Id.
Orpen [1931] All ER at 363-64.
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After the ruling, Ms. Orpen commented that "[i]t was necessary
that a test action of the kind should have been brought, and the terms
of the judgment show that. It means that kinemas [sic] will have to
close on Sundays or that the law will have to be amended." 398 Her
statement does not suggest a strong conviction one way or the other
on the question of whether cinemas should be allowed to operate on
Sundays. Her claim to public service rested on having clarified an
unsettled point of law. Articles shortly after the decision noted
multiple obstacles that might hinder collection of the £5,000
judgment: the case was being appealed, Parliament was considering
legislation that would require dismissal of Ms. Orpen's claims, and
the Crown had power under an 1875 statute to remit forfeitures
imposed on the cinema. 399 A week after the judgment, Ms. Orpen's
law firm announced that she had signed a deed renouncing the £5,000
penalties from Haymarket and that, in fact, it had always been her
intention to relinquish them.400 The claim that she never intended to
collect the money seems a bit implausible, particularly given that Ms.
Orpen's attorney had unsuccessfully pressed Haymarket to give up
its right to seek remission of the penalties in exchange for Ms. Orpen's
agreement to a stay pending appeal. 40 1 In any event, Ms. Orpen's
inability to collect the forfeiture from Haymarket was cemented a
short time later when the Home Secretary sent a letter advising that
4 02
the King had decided to remit the entire £5,000 penalty.
Ms. Orpen's short career as a common informer resulted in two
pieces of legislation, with one being merely temporary. 4 03 When
Ms. Orpen filed her lawsuits, Parliament began working on
legislation to prevent copycat claims by other informers, and the
statute was eventually expanded to require dismissal of Ms. Orpen's
pending claims as well. 404 In September 1931, the Home Secretary

398. Informer Gets £5,000 Damages, PORTSMOUTH EvENING NEWS, July 17,
1931, at 9.
399. Informer's £5,000 Award: Will She Actually Get the Money?, BIRMINGHAM
GAZETTE, July 18, 1931, at 1 [hereinafter Informer's £5,000 Award]; Sunday
Cinema "Informer"Awarded£5,000, NEWS CHRON. (London), July 18, 1931, at 3.
400. "Informer's"£5,000: Penalties Renounced by Miss Millie Orpen, LEED'S
MERCURY, July 22, 1931, at 5; Common Informer Relinquishes £5,000: Never
Intended to Take Penalties, BiOScOPE (London), July 22, 1931, at 14.
401. Sunday Cinema "Informer"Awarded£5,000, supra note 399, at 3.
402. Sunday Kinemas, N. DAILY MAIL (Hartlepool), July 24, 1931, at 10; That's
£5,000 - That Was!, BIoScOPE (London), July 29, 1931, at 22.
403. See generally Sunday Performances (Temporary Regulation) Act 1931,
21 & 22 Geo. 5 c. 52 (Eng.); Sunday Entertainments Act 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c.
51 (Eng.).
404. See Informer's £5,000 Award, supra note 399, at 1; Millie Orpen Gets
Costs, BIOScOPE (London), Oct. 21, 1931, at 24.
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urged Parliament to "clarify the present ridiculous position."405
Without new legislation, the "ancient and obsolete" Sunday
Observance Act would continue in force and "amusements as innocent
as band concerts, lectures and debates will be illegal on Sunday."4 06
The police would either have to overlook violations or enforce the Act
"with a vigorous and ruthless hand" that the public would never
The next month, Parliament passed the Sunday
tolerate. 407
Performances ("Temporary Regulation") Act of 1931, which dismissed
pending claims under the Sunday Observance Act and prevented the
filing of further claims without the approval of the Attorney General
or Solicitor General. 408 The court was allowed to award costs in
pending actions, so Ms. Orpen did not walk away empty-handed. 4 09
The act was to continue in force for no more than a year and
authorized local authorities like the LCC to license Sunday cinema
exhibitions and musical performances. 410
The Temporary Regulation was replaced the following year by
the Sunday Entertainments Act of 1932 ("Sunday Entertainments
Act"). 411 On the controversial topic of Sunday cinema, the statute
grandfathered in the power of local governments that had been
licensing Sunday film exhibitions to continue doing so, with
conditions requiring charitable donation of some or all of the profits
and provisions protecting workers against a seven-day work week. 4 12
The statute also provided a route for new local governments to seek
the power to license Sunday cinema exhibitions if there was adequate
popular support in the jurisdiction. 4 13 In addition, the act conferred
on local governments the power to license Sunday musical
performances and exempted museums, picture galleries, zoological
gardens, botanical gardens, lectures, and debates from the

405.

Mr. Clynes Condemns 1781 Act: Threatens Even Sunday Bands!, DAILY

HERALD (London), Sept. 3, 1931, at 9 [hereinafter Mr. Clynes Condemns].

406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Sunday Performances (Temporary Regulation) Act 1931, 21 & 22 Geo. 5,
c. 52, § 2.
409. Sunday Performances (Temporary Regulation) Act, § 2. Ms. Orpen was
awarded costs in one of the pending actions, but also ordered to pay costs of
individual directors against whom she did not proceed. Common Informer's
Costs: Sunday Cinemas Question, EvENING TEL. (Dundee), Oct. 19, 1931, at 10;

Millie Orpen Gets Costs, supra note 404, at 24. She settled at least one of the
other pending cases. Miss Millie Orpen, SUNDERLAND ECHo & SHIPPING GAZETTE,
Oct. 13, 1931, at 1.
410. Sunday Performances (Temporary Regulation) Act 1931, 21 & 22 Geo. 5
c. 52, §§ 1(1), 3(3).
411. Sunday Entertainments Act 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5 c. 51, § 6(2).
412. See id. § 1.
413. Id. § 1 & Schedule.
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restrictions of the Sunday Observance Act. 414 While some members
of Parliament wanted to allow theaters to open on Sundays, the
legislation did not go that far. 415
The statute ultimately enacted was a compromise measure
crafted after an earlier bill providing broad authorization for Sunday
cinema failed to garner adequate support. 4 16 Though the Lord's Day
Observance Society succeeded in narrowing the scope of
parliamentary action, the Sunday Entertainments Act still seems like
a defeat for the strict Sabbatarian position. One opponent of the
legislation complained that Parliament had "legalised illegality" by
grandfathering in Sunday cinema licenses improperly issued by the
LCC and other public bodies. 417 The legislative changes seemed like
a parliamentary admission that the eighteenth-century Sunday
Observance Act was outdated and unduly restrictive. 4 18
The Lord's Day Observance Society and the cinema industry
found themselves embroiled in a series of local contests in which
citizens were asked whether to authorize Sunday cinema in
particular jurisdictions. 4 19 These local contests "concentrated public

Id. §§ 3-4.
415. This Week in Parliament:Free Vote on Sunday Cinemas Bill, YORKSHIRE
POST, Apr. 11, 1932, at 7 (noting that MPs supporting Sunday theater would vote
against earlier Sunday cinema bill, along with Sabbatarians); Stage Celebrities'
Plea to M.P.'s: The Theatre "Ruthlessly Overridden,"EDINBURGH EVENING NEWS,
June 21, 1932, at 6 (MPs heard plea from stage actors to allow Sunday opening
of theaters on same terms as cinemas).
414.

416. Sunday Amusements, SHEFFIELD DAILY TEL., May 13, 1932, at 6; A New
Sunday Cinemas Bill: PresentMeasure to Be Scrapped, LIVERPOOL ECHO, May 12,

&

1932, at 8.
417. Dr. R.C. Gillie Criticises: Sunday Entertainment Act, BATH CHRON.
HERALD, Aug. 6, 1932, at 19.
418. Leading figures in the church began articulating a more permissive
attitude toward Sunday cinema. The Archbishop of Canterbury spoke in favor of
the Sunday Entertainments Act in the House of Lords, and his remarks were
later re-published by those supporting expansion of Sunday cinema to new areas.
See, e.g., Advertisement, RUGBY ADVERTISER, Jan. 24, 1936, at 3 (advertisement

for the Rugby Sunday Cinema Association). The Bishop of Croydon spoke in favor
of permitting Sunday cinema in his city after industry representatives promised

that church representatives would be involved in selecting wholesome films
suitable for Sunday exhibition. "Talkies" in the Streets: Test Programme on
Sunday, CROYDON TIMES, Nov. 26, 1932, at 1; Wholesome Films: Definite
Undertakingof Adequate Supply, CROYDON TIMES, Nov. 26, 1932, at 11; see also

Bishop's Support: Croydon Council Approves Sunday Cinemas, YORKSHIRE POST,
Oct. 4, 1932, at 7 (discussing the Croydon Borough Council's vote to allow Sunday
films and the committee's composition, including the Bishop of Croydon and a
representative of "the Free Churches").
419. Sunday Cinemas, SHIELDS NEWS, Oct. 4, 1933, at 2; W. Holt White, The
Sunday Cinema: The Battle Royal Which Is Now to Be Fought in 750 Electoral
Areas, SPHERE, Dec. 10, 1932, at 418-19, 454.
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attention" on "the general question of Sunday entertainments."4 20 As
one journalist noted, "[t]o open cinemas on Sundays is to open the
floodgates of all forms of public pleasure and entertainment which are
not positively pernicious." 421 The legislative and political setback for
the strict Sabbatarian position came about in significant part because
of Ms. Orpen's litigation. 422 The large penalties she sought infused
the Sunday cinema question with an urgency that even the earlier
court ruling on the subject had not generated. 423
2.

Common Informers and World War II

Ms. Orpen's highly publicized actions against London cinemas
raised the visibility of popular actions as an effective and potentially
lucrative means of enforcing the remaining restrictions of the Sunday
Observance Act. In the years that followed, common informers
recovered penalties against forms of Sunday entertainment
A
Parliament had not exempted in the 1932 legislation. 424
congregational minister, for instance, won £1,500 in penalties with
respect to Sunday boxing matches, immediately pledging not to use a
penny for himself, but to donate the money to a religious or charitable
institution. 425 Other informers won penalties against organizers of
"all in" wrestling exhibitions and newspapers that advertised the
events. 426

420. Sunday Cinema Controversy: Aftermath of Croydon Poll, YORKSHIRE
POST, Dec. 1, 1932, at 8.
421. Sunday Entertainment, ECKINGTON, WooDHOUSE & STAVELEY EXPREsS,
Apr. 16, 1932, at 5; see also I.J.C., Letter to the Editor, Sunday Entertainments
Bill, SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh), June 9, 1932, at 7 (letter to the editor from Scottish

Sabbatarian characterizing Sunday cinema as "the thin edge of the wedge").
422.
423.

See supra text accompanying notes 403-410.
See Mr. Clynes Condemns, supra note 405 (reporting on Home Secretary

Clynes's condemnation of the Sabbatarian law after Ms. Opren's £5,000
judgment).
424. As noted above, the 1932 legislation exempted those involved with any
"musical entertainment ... museum, picture gallery, zoological or botanical
garden or aquarium . .. [or] any lecture or debate." Sunday Entertainments Act

1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5 c. 51,
425.

"Common

§§ 4(b), 4(c), 4(d) (Eng.).

Informer":

Congregational Minister

Awarded

£1500,

ScOTSMAN (Edinburgh), July 6, 1932, at 13.
426. £300 for "Common Informer": Sunday All-In Wrestling Bouts, EVENING
TEL. & POST (Dundee), Jan. 16, 1936, at 4 (informer awarded £300 for all-in
wrestling at Chelsea Palace); Common Informer: Two More Awards in All-In
Wrestling Cases, N. DAILY MAIL (Hartlepool), Jan. 20, 1936, at 1 (awards of £350
against newspaper for advertising Sunday wrestling and £400 against organizer);

see also King Halves Common Informer'sAward, Following Petitionfor Clemency,
EVESHAM STANDARD & W. MIDLAND OBSERVER, May 16, 1936, at 5 (King remits
half of £300 award to informer in all-in wrestling case).
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The legislative proceedings following Ms. Orpen's claims led
many members of Parliament to develop decidedly negative views of
common informers and popular enforcement. 427 Two years after the
passage of the Sunday Entertainments Act, Sir Gerald Hurst received
permission to introduce legislation that would prohibit penal actions
by common informers; enforcement actions would instead be brought
by government officials or by private parties injured by a statutory
violation. 428 Introducing the bill, Hurst told members about a Sunday
garden party for charity that was thwarted when an individual living
184 miles away threatened a lawsuit. 429 Characterizing common
informer litigation as a form of legalized blackmail, Hurst suggested
that decisions to enforce the Sunday Observance Act should be made
by public officials. 430 Hurst realized his bill was introduced too late
in the session to have a chance at passage but wanted to begin the
abolition debate and lay the groundwork for later legislative action. 43 1
After the commencement of World War II, the government
drafted a defense regulation that would allow local authorities to
license the Sunday opening of live theaters and dance halls. 432
Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary, suggested that only a
minority of the public was strongly opposed to Sunday theater. 433 He
believed additional forms of Sunday entertainment would help
maintain the spirits of workers taxed by the war effort and was a
reasonable extension of the statutory permission already granted for
licensing Sunday movies. 434 After a debate, however, Parliament by
a margin of eight votes rejected the government's order expanding the
list of permissible Sunday entertainments. 4 35 A large contingent of
Members of Parliament ("MPs") with posts in the government
abstained. 436 They did not want to vote in favor of Sunday opening,

427. Common Informer: Condemnation by Members of Parliament, N. DAILY
MAIL (Hartlepool), July 23, 1931, at 5 (several MPs criticize common informers in

&

debate over Consumers' Council Bill).
428. Stop Common Informer: Commons Welcomes New Bill, COURIER
ADVERTISER (Dundee), Nov. 7, 1934, at 3.
429. Id.
430. Id.; The Common Informer, SHIELDS NEWS, Nov. 10, 1934, at 2.
431. See Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 603-04.
432. The Proposed Sunday Theatre Order: Controversy May Be Renewed at
West Hartlepool, N. DAILY MAIL (Hartlepool), Feb. 21, 1941, at 3.
433. No Sunday Theatre Opening: M.P.s Declare Against Recent Order,
ScoTSMAN (Edinburgh), Apr. 2, 1941, at 9 [hereinafter No Sunday Theatre
Opening].
434. Id.
435. Id.
436.

Sunday Theatre Problem: CongratulationsSent to Mr. Magnay, N. DAILY

MAIL (Hartlepool), Apr. 2, 1941, at 1; see also No Sunday Theatre Opening, supra
note 433 (noting that only "280 M.P.s went into the division lobbies" to vote).
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but the Home Secretary had bound them not to vote against the
measure. 4 37

Some theater fans objected to Parliament's action as
unreasonable, noting that the British Broadcasting Company ("BBC")
often broadcast theatrical performances on Sundays. It seemed ironic
that one could watch the movie version of No Time for Comedy on a
Sunday, but the law prevented one from seeing the stage version a
short distance away. 438 Following the failed attempt to authorize
Sunday theater and dancing, the Lord Chancellor told a select
committee of the House of Commons that litigation involving common
informers was a "monstrous machine" and that he did not think
439
The
litigation involving informers "was creditable to anybody."
the
but
select committee proposed abolition of the common informer,
440
proposal was not implemented.
Common informers continued to stir up controversy as World
War II unfolded, repeatedly targeting events designed to benefit the
troops or war-related charities. 441 The Liverpool Echo noted that
common informers had become active during the war. 442 Those
organizing shows for the troops or benefits for war charities often
planned the events on Sundays because professional artists would be
free to perform. 443 While the 1932 legislation exempted musical
performances from the Sunday Observance Act, common informers
threatened legal proceedings if the organizers planned anything like
444
A
a variety show or the performers intended to wear costumes.
437. Sunday Theatre Problem: Congratulations Sent to Mr. Magnay, supra
note 436.
438. Sunday Theatre "Unreason,"YORKSHIRE EVENING PoST, Apr. 4, 1941, at

6; No Sunday Theatre Opening, supra note 433.
439. The Common Informer: Should Be Abolished, Says Lord Simon, BELFAST
NEWSL., June 20, 1941, at 2 (reporting on Lord Chancellor's testimony to select

committee); Common Informer: Sir John Simon on "a Cut-Throat Business," N.
DAILY MAIL (Hartlepool), June 20, 1941, at 3 (same); Editorial, The Informer,
MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS, June 20, 1941, at 4 (common informer actions

anachronistic and have no public support; would not be a bad thing if they ended
up a war casualty).

440.

Common Informer: ProposedAbolition of Rights, BELFAST NEWSL., Feb.

6, 1942, at 6 (House of Commons approves report of select committee, which
included proposal to abolish rights of common informers).

See, e.g., Common Informer Stops Gift Draw: Leicester Was Running One
HARBOROUGH ADVERTISER & MIDLAND MAIL, May 28, 1943,
at 11 (informer contacts police to shut down gift drawing to benefit prisoners of
war after organizers had collected £1,400).
441.

for P.O.W. Fund, MKT.
442.

The Common Informer, LIVERPOOL ECHO, Nov. 7, 1942, at 2.

443.

Id.

444. Id. The paper described common informers as "a survival from a less
enlightened age," but noted that the House of Commons did not have time during

the war to debate an abolition bill. Id. In one case, a local authority decided to
ignore an anonymous letter threatening qui tam litigation if a Sunday concert
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member of Parliament asked the Home Secretary whether he had
looked into abuses by common informers relating to Sunday
Home Secretary Morrison
entertainments for the troops. 445
responded: "I fully sympathise with the objections to the antiquated
provisions as to suing for penalties which can be abused by
individuals not interested in any public purpose but in the chance of
making money." 446 However, he deemed it impossible to amend the
law "without raising the whole question of Sunday entertainment."447
The activities of common informers helped generate controversy
between local officials and the Lord's Day Observance Society
("LDOS"). 448 The Whitefield Urban District Council adopted a
resolution in 1944 asking Parliament to amend the Sunday
Observance Act, suggesting that the statutory scheme conferred
unwarranted power on the LDOS:
The Council are confident that the Lord's Day Observance
Society does not, by its actions, express the feeling of the great
majority of the community and they consider that steps should
be taken to induce Parliament to introduce the necessary
legislation to remove the existing anomaly whereby the society
are in a position to prevent Sunday entertainments being given
for the benefit of members of the services, the public and the
charities for which they are organised. 449

Whitefield circulated the resolution to around 300 other local
councils, seeking their support. 4 50 This led the LDOS to draft letters
of its own to local authorities, responding to the Whitefield Council's
implication that LDOS was responsible for the activities of common
informers enforcing the Sunday Observance Act. 45 1 Some local
jurisdictions voted to support the Whitefield resolution, while others
declined. 452
took place as scheduled, given that the Sunday Entertainments Act allowed
musical performances. Common Informer's Threat: Heywood Committee Ignores
It, ROCHDALE OBSERVER, Jan. 22, 1944, at 5.
445. Common Informer, LIVERPOOL EVENING EXPRESS, Jan. 20, 1944, at 4.

446. Id.
447. Id.
448. See, e.g., Ramsgate Town Council: Sunday EntertainmentsDebate, THANET
ADVERTISER & ECHO, Feb. 4,

449. Id.
450. Council's

Revolt

1944,

at

Against

1.
L.D.O.S.:

"The

Common

Informer,"

KINEMATOGRAPH WKLY., Jan. 20, 1944, at 5 (Whitefield resolution on agenda at
perhaps 300 councils).

451. Bradford Council Debate on Sunday Shows: Views on the Alleged
5; The

Activities of a Society, YORKSHIRE POST & LEEDS MERCURY, Feb. 9, 1944, at
Common Informer: Council Seeks a Way Out, supra note 42, at 20.

452. See, e.g., The Common Informer: Council Seeks a Way Out, supranote 42,
at 20 (Holyland Urban District Council and Padiham Council support Whitefield
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While the Whitefield resolution was circulating for debate,
Members of Parliament raised the issue with the Home Secretary,
expressing hope that Parliament would be given the opportunity to
reverse its earlier vote on Sunday entertainments. 4 53 The Home
Secretary sympathized with the concerns expressed: "About the
common informer, [Mr. Morrison] shared the general feeling of the
House. It was an antiquated and undesirable device. Individuals had
454
exploited the Act to an extent which came very near blackmail."
However, Morrison cast doubt on claims about the role of the LDOS:
"I have had no evidence that the Lord's Day Observance Society is in
the least involved in that kind of activity." 455 As to a new vote in
Parliament, the government had not detected a shift in legislative
sentiment that would warrant reopening the Sunday entertainments
The LDOS celebrated Morrison's statements as a
debate. 456
vindication. 457
The government did take steps two months later to rein in a
particular abuse by common informers. 458 The Home Secretary
informed the House of Commons that he had "been in consultation
with the Lord Chancellor about cases in which the common informer
4 59
arranges with the offender to compound [i.e., settle] the penalty."
These often-secret settlements presumably formed the basis for
Morrison's earlier comments about informers engaging in conduct
"very near blackmail." 460 As noted previously, comparable conduct by
informers had been addressed in a sixteenth-century statute enacted
during Queen Elizabeth I's reign. 46 1 The Home Secretary and the
Lord Chancellor agreed, based on the Elizabethan statute, that an
informer's settlement of a claim for statutory penalties required

resolution); Leominster Borough Council, KINGTON TIMES & N. HERTFORDSHIRE

ADVERTISER, Jan. 29, 1944, at 3 (Leominster Borough Council debates and votes
&

not to support Whitefield resolution).
453. Sunday Shows Anomaly: M.P.s Want It Swept Away, DUNDEE COURIER
ADVERTISER, Feb. 4, 1944, at 2.

454.

Id.

455. A Victory for Sunday: L.D.O.S. "Fullof Rejoicing," BIGGLESWADE CHRON.
& BEDFORDSHIRE GAZETTE, Feb. 25, 1944, at 8.

456.

Sunday Shows Anomaly: M.P.s Want It Swept Away, supra note 453, at

457.

See A Victory for Sunday: L.D.O.S. "Fullof Rejoicing," supra note 455, at

2.
8.
458. Common Informer: Sunday Observance Cases, BELFAST NEWSL., Apr. 7,
1944, at 3.
459. Id. See Compound, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (third
definition of "compound" is "[t]o settle (a matter, esp. a debt) by a money payment,

in lieu of other

liability; to adjust by agreement").

460.

Sunday Shows Anomaly: M.P.s Want It Swept Away, supra note 453, at

461.

Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 587.

2.
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judicial consent and that this consent "ought to be made in open court
so that there may be public knowledge of any such proceedings." 462
Parliament's failure to take more aggressive action allowed
common informers to continue disrupting charitable events scheduled
for Sundays. 463 An informer reportedly shut down a Christmas
drawing for British and Allied airmen in 1944 after 5,000 tickets had
been sold.464 Plans for a post-war event to support a British Legion
building fund were completely revised after receipt of a letter from
the LDOS contending that the anticipated "variety concert" format
would violate the Sunday Entertainments Act.465 Several of the
original performers were excluded and others substituted based on
the risk of suit by a common informer. 466 A branch of the R.A.F.
Association cancelled a variety show due to fear of popular
enforcement. 467 The local chapter then persuaded the national
organization to pass a resolution at its 1949 annual conference
deploring the ability of common informers to prevent a registered war
charity from staging a Sunday variety show. 468 The following month,
an MP asked the new Home Secretary, J. Chuter Ede, for legislation
updating the Sunday Observance Act and taking enforcement "out of
the hands of cranks, busybodies and cheap informers." 46 9 Ede
responded that "[t]his matter would entail very great controversy,
and at the present time there is no prospect of legislation." 470
3.

Common Informer No.
Houghton-le-Touzel

1: Alfred Green, a.k.a. Anthony

Millie Orpen enjoyed celebrity status for a few months in 1930-31
as the mysterious twenty-three-year-old common informer who
sought large penalties against London cinemas. 47 1 The press later
became even more fascinated with Alfred William Green, who they

462. Common Informer: Sunday Observance Cases, BELFAST NEWSL., supra
note 458, at 3.
463. See, e.g., GLOUCESTERSHIRE ECHo, Nov. 23, 1944, at 4; Fairplay, Letter to
the Editor, The Common Informer, BROUGHTY FERRY GUIDE & CARNOUSTIE
GAZETTE, Dec. 9, 1944, at 3.
464.

GLOUCESTERSHIRE ECHO, supranote 463, at 4.

465.

Local Concert Upset: Action by Lord's Day Observance Society, HALIFAX

DAILY COURIER & GUARDIAN, Feb. 11, 1946, at 2.

466. Id.
467. "Common Informer Threat": Why Sunday Show Was Cancelled, N. WALES
WKLY. NEWS, Sept. 16, 1948, at 5.
468. Attack on Common Informer: Call for Repeal of Act Banning Sunday
Charity Shows, NOTTINGHAM J., June 13, 1949, at 5.
469. Ede Will Not Stop "Common Informer," NOTTINGHAM J., July 8, 1949, at
5.
470. Id.
471. See supra notes 371-423 and accompanying text.
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began calling Britain's "Common Informer No. 1."472 Green also
began informing at twenty-three years of age, like Ms. Orpen, but
kept at it on and off for fifteen years, eventually changing his name
Green's reputation was
to "Anthony Houghton-le-Touzel." 473
sufficiently problematic that, when he assumed his new name,
several members of the ancient "le Touzel" family publicly disclaimed
any familial connection. 474
Green/le Touzel once described his first legal action as a
desperate effort to escape the extreme poverty of his childhood: "Only
a man in despair would do what I did-bring an action on his own
with no legal knowledge or experience. But a man who is hungry and
homeless seizes any remote chance of a meal and a bed." 4 75 The real
story may be closer to the less dramatic version he later told a
bankruptcy court. Green/le Touzel worked as a clerk until he came
across the Sunday Observance Act and "recognised its possibilities,"
at which point he became a professional informer. 4 76 He once told a
jury that "[h]e did not see why he should confine himself with being a
£6 a week clerk, when he could create for himself, by personal hard
work, a career that would bring him a much larger sum." 477 Green/le
Touzel claimed that he made between £1,500-2,000 annually in the
478
years before the war.

Green/le Touzel sometimes attributed his Sunday Observance
Act claims to his "religious conscience," though he also admitted that
"I like money and I get a very handsome return." 479 He was careful
to note in one interview that "I do not describe my activities as an
occupation-for the income tax authorities might begin to wonder
whether it was in fact an occupation." 480 Green/le Touzel was less

472. See, e.g., Christian Petersen, One of the Strangest Ways of Making
Money-Legally: Profits of a Common Informer, SUNDAY DISPATCH (London), May
15, 1949 at 1; The Man Who Was Common Informer No. 1, DAILY MIRROR

(London), Oct. 4, 1951, at 3.
473. The Man Who Was Common Informer No. 1, supra note 472, at 3.
474. Christian Petersen, Informer Green Offers Truce-But Makes Another
£315 in a Week, SUNDAY DISPATCH (London), May 22, 1949, at 3 (Mr. Gibbon
Monypenny le Touzel and his nephew John Francis Monypenny le Touzel
complain about new name selected by common informer); E.F.G. le Touzel, Letter
to the Editor, "Not Me, Sir!," SUNDAY PICTORIAL (London), Jan. 15, 1950, at 16
(letter from E.F.G. le Touzel denying family connection to common informer).
475. Ralph Champion, 'I do it for money' says Britain's No. 1 Common
Informer, SUNDAY PICTORIAL (London), Jan. 8, 1950, at 3.
476. The Man Who Was Common Informer No. 1, supra note 472, at 3.

477.

Common Informer Sues for Alleged Libel: Mr. Green Defends a Good

Money Job,' COVENTRY EVENING TEL., Nov. 20, 1950, at 1 [hereinafter Common
Informer Sues].
478. Petersen, supra note 472, at 1.
479. Id.; Informer Green Offers Truce, supra note 474, at 3.
480. Petersen, supra note 472, at 7.
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nuanced about his motivations in later statements: "I do not bring
these actions from any religious motive. I bring them solely to make
money." 481 As he told a jury, "I do not stand up as the champion of
the Christian Sunday. I do not go to church and I do not profess to be
one of those persons-I wish I was." 482 He denied any connection to
the Lord's Day Observance Society and criticized them for stopping a
Sunday cricket match organized for charity. 483
Green/le Touzel once claimed to have "fought between 200 and
300 cases" under the Sunday Observance Act, 484 though he later gave
a bankruptcy court the more modest figure of "more than fifty
His first common informer action sought £400 in
actions."485
penalties as a result of a Sunday boxing match. 486 Green won
penalties totaling £350: £200 from the "keeper" of the boxing ring,
£100 from the "master of ceremonies," and £50 from the printer of a
magazine advertisement. 4 87 An additional claim for £50 failed
because the judge decided that the name of a printing company on a
handbill was not sufficient evidence, by itself, to prove that the
company had actually done the printing. 488 From the start, Green
pursued cases pro se, rather than hiring lawyers to prosecute for
him. 489 While he was disliked by the businesses he targeted, solicitors
were said to have a secret respect for his work preparing cases and
his knowledge of the law.490 He boasted that he once "stood alone
against nine K.C.s [King's Counsel] and five junior counsel." 491 The
Lord Chancellor supposedly told him that the bar would need to put
up a statue in his honor because of all the work he generated for
them. 492

Green/le Touzel devoted significant attention to dance halls that
opened on Sunday, making him "the most hated man in the world of
dancing." 493 Companies sought to avoid liability under the Sunday
Observance Act by selling memberships in dance clubs and confining

481.
482.
483.

Champion, supra note 475, at 3.
Common Informer Sues, supra note 477, at 1.
Champion, supra note 475, at 3.

484.

Petersen, supra note 472, at 1.

485. The Man Who Was Common Informer No. 1, supra note 472, at 3.
486. See Green v. Berliner [1936] 2 KB 477 at 479 (Eng.).
487. Id. at 489, 491, 497.
488. Id. at 491-95.
489. Christian Petersen, Common Informer Gives Up-But He Is Going to Get
a Shock, SUNDAY DISPATCH (London), Nov. 26, 1950, at 1 (when friend pointed out
cost of lawyers would diminish recovery, Green joked, "I will do it myself"; friend
dared Green and he accepted challenge).
490.

Petersen, supra note 472, at 1.

491. Id.
492. Informer Green Offers Truce, supra note 474, at 3.
493. Petersen, supra note 472, at 1.
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Sunday dancing to those who were already members. 494 But laxity in
enforcing these rules could create a risk of litigation. 49 5 Green/le
Touzel reportedly joined a dance club on one occasion and used the
manner of his enrollment as evidence of a violation. 496 On another
occasion, he won a case for £200 against Mecca, Ltd. when his wife
was allowed to purchase a ticket for Sunday dancing at a dance hall
in Brighton. 497
Mecca had reportedly settled three prior cases pursued by
Green/le Touzel for £100, £100, and £50.498 Reporters found a similar
pattern with other dance companies: "Managements, we find, have
taken it in turns to pay le Touzel. It has been cheaper than
While Green/le Touzel reportedly received court
fighting." 499
approval to settle his actions (at least after 1944, when the courts
began insisting on the point) there is evidence that his settlements
included additional terms not publicly disclosed. 500 For instance, one
newspaper account reported on a letter Green/le Touzel sent to a large
dance promotion firm. In the letter, the informer suggested that "a
truce 'for a few years' MUST be good business or other companies
would not have agreed to one." 50 1 He mentioned a payment of "300
guineas" the previous week by a firm of solicitors in exchange for an
undisclosed "gentlemen's agreement." 502 The implication is that
companies were paying Green/le Touzel for a prospective promise to

leave them alone for some period of time after a case was settled. If
so, Green/le Touzel was not simply reaching settlements regarding
past violations of the Sunday Observance Act but, in effect, giving
businesses his own personal license to violate the statute in the future
without threat of litigation by "Britain's Common Informer No. 1."
Mecca, Ltd.'s 1950 decision to fight a case brought by Green/le
Touzel was a departure from their prior practice of settling claims. 503
Reporters quoted Mecca's managing director as saying: "Nonsense to

all this.
494.
495.

No more pacts or agreements .

. ..

Let's fight so that

Id.
See id. ("But the legality of this method has always depended mainly

upon the ability of the halls to prevent non-members from gaining admittance.").

496. Id.
497. Informer's Wife Says She Went to 'Exotic'Dancing-Hall, DAILY MIRROR
(London), Feb. 21, 1950, at 12 (wife's testimony about buying Sunday dancing
ticket); Houghton-le Touzel v. Mecca, Ltd. [1950] 2 KB 612 at 616 (Eng.) (allowing
le Touzel's action to proceed because "a limited company is within" the "Sunday
Observance Act"); The Dance Hall Case: £200 Award, BIRMINGHAM GAZETTE, Feb.

22, 1950, at 5 (£200 award against Mecca, Ltd.).
498.

PersonalityParade,SUNDAY PICTORIAL (London), Feb. 26, 1950, at 8.

499.
500.
501.
502.
503.

Id.
See Informer Green Offers Truce, supra note 474, at 3.
Id.
Id.
See PersonalityParade,supra note 498, at 8.
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everyone will know about the man." 504 The decision to litigate
significantly altered the financial incentives for Green/le Touzel.
While he won £200 against Mecca, plus costs of £4 (since he pursued
the action pro se), he lost a related case against Sherry's (Brighton),
Ltd., which owned the dance hall where Mecca's event took place. 505
The court awarded costs to Sherry's that, by one estimate, might total
£600.506 Adding insult to injury, the Home Secretary remitted half of
the award against Mecca, reducing it to £100.507
Later that year, Green/le Touzel filed a libel action against the
owners and publishers of Dance News, based in part on an article
titled: "Common Informer Menace to Sunday Dance Clubs." 508
However, he dismissed the action part way through trial, resulting in
another significant award of £567 in costs. 509 A few days later,
Green/le Touzel announced he was ending his career as a common
informer. 5 10 The effort of litigating was worthwhile when defendants
settled quickly, but it no longer made sense now that "every action I
bring will be fought." 511 The Home Secretary "always" reduced the
penalty by half under the remittance statute, so that a £200 award at
trial resulted in a £100 recovery. 512 A recovery of that size did not
justify the eighteen months of hard work required to take a case to
trial. 513
This was the second time Green/le Touzel had announced his
retirement as a common informer. 514 In the late 1930s, he had been
hit with large cost awards in unsuccessful cases. 5 15 When one of the
defendants sued Green/le Touzel to recover an award of costs, it
turned out that he had relocated to Paris. 516 He sent a letter read in
court indicating that he was "entirely finished with that career." 517

504. Id.
505. Id.; The Dance Hall Case: £200 Award, supra note 497, at 5.
506.
507.

PersonalityParade,supra note 498, at 8.
Common Informer Sues, supra note 477, at 1.

508. 'No Spiv,' Says Informer in Libel Action, DAILY MAIL (Hull), Nov. 20,
1950, at 5.
509. Id.; The Man Who Was Common Informer No. 1, supra note 472, at 3
(costs of £567 awarded in libel action).
510.

Petersen, Common Informer Gives Up, supra note 489, at 1.

511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id., see also Informer Writes: "Finished,"DAILY HERALD (London), Feb.
17, 1939, at 7 (Le Touzel's first retirement).
515. See, e.g., Sunday Observance Claim Fails: Informer to Pay Costs,
NORFOLK & SUFFOLK J. & DIss EXPRESS, Feb. 19, 1937, at 2; "Common Informer"
Protest: Actions Becoming a Scandal, Says K.C., EVENING TELEGRAPH (Dundee),

Jan. 27, 1939, at 10.
516. Informer Writes: "Finished,"supra note 514.
517. Id.
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However, he later backtracked, bringing additional popular actions
after he was discharged from the army. 518 Green/le Touzel did not
have time to rethink his second retirement from enforcement of the
Sunday Observance Act. With the support of the government,
Parliament quickly pushed through legislation that abolished the
office of common informer in English law.5 19 Green/le Touzel filed for
bankruptcy, claiming he had technically been insolvent since 1937
due to outstanding awards of costs entered against him, which he had
520
never paid but could still be collected.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF S.B. 8: INTENDED AND UNINTENDED

We have observed that our legal system seeks to minimize the
impact of personal interests that might influence public officials in
the performance of their duties. 52 1 Statutes providing for popular
enforcement, on the other hand, expressly offer personal financial
rewards to motivate enforcement activities and leave room for pursuit
of other personal concerns. 522 The interests of informers often conflict
with interests of the public, leading to abusive enforcement activities
and unfair litigation tactics.5 2 3
We looked more carefully at two circumstances in which England
turned to popular enforcement to implement unusually controversial
legislation. Informers enforcing the Gin Act and twentieth-century
informers enforcing the Sunday Observance Act often pursued
5 24
The
financial gain in a manner inconsistent with the common good.
a
public
such
generated
Act
Gin
the
activities of informers under
backlash that the statute became unenforceable, while popular
enforcement of the Sunday Observance Act undermined respect for
the law, leading Parliament to chip away at the statute and
eventually to abolish popular enforcement altogether.5 25 In this Part,
we draw on the history of popular enforcement to consider ways in

518. Petersen, supra note 472, at 7. Green/Le Touzel claimed that he had
"cleaned up all Liverpool" while he was in the army. Id.
519. Petersen, Common Informer Gives Up, supra note 489, at 1 (ministers
supporting bill to abolish common informer); Lord's Day Act Informer, YORKSHIRE

OBSERVER, July 2, 1951, at 3 (bill abolishing common informers receives royal
assent).
520. The Man Who Was Common Informer No. 1, supra note 472, at 3.
521.
522.

See supra notes 58-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-109 and accompanying text.

523.

See supra notes 110-204 and accompanying text.

524.
525.

See supra notes 205-520 and accompanying text.
See From Wye's Letter, and the London Prints, NEWCASTLE COURANT, at

2 (two informers under the Gin Act killed by mob); see also sources cited supra
note 519 (abolition of the Sunday Observance Act).
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which the informer's conflict of interest could produce unseemly,
pointless, and abusive litigation by plaintiffs enforcing S.B. 8.526
A.

PopularActions Under S.B. 8

Under S.B. 8, a physician considering an abortion must
determine whether the fetus has "a detectable heartbeat" and
memorialize the results in the patient's medical records.5 2 7 A
physician violates the statute if he performs or induces an abortion
28
after detecting a heartbeat or failing to conduct appropriate tests. 5
The statute recognizes an exception when the doctor believes "a
medical emergency exists that prevents compliance" and makes
notations concerning the emergency in the medical records. 529
S.B. 8 authorizes any person "other than an officer or employee
of a state or local governmental entity" to file a civil action against
any person who (1) performs or induces an abortion violating the
statute, (2) aids or abets such an abortion, or (3) "intends to engage
in conduct" that would result in liability.5 3 0 Under the aiding or
abetting provision, the person must "knowingly" engage in the
challenged conduct but can be liable regardless of whether the person
knew the abortion would be performed in a manner violating the
statute.5 31 At the same time, the statute provides an affirmative
defense to a defendant who reasonably believes after a reasonable
investigation that the doctor complied with or would comply with the
statute. 532 So, for instance, an insurance company that pays for an
illegal abortion would presumably be liable if it simply assumed a
doctor followed the law but could have an affirmative defense if an
investigation established a reasonable basis for believing the doctor

did so.
526. The Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs removes the most likely federal
constitutional impediment to litigation under S.B. 8. See Dobbs v. Jackson
Women's Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022) (authority to regulate abortion
rests with the people and their elected representatives). The ultimate extent of
enforcement activity under S.B. 8 may depend on the outcome of the pending

state constitutional challenges to the statute. See supra note 26 (discussing state
trial court decision declaring S.B. 8 unlawful under various state constitutional
theories). For the short term, abortion providers have changed their practices to
avoid claims under the statute. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Some

of the hypothetical S.B. 8 lawsuits discussed below would be most likely to occur
in a scenario where the statute remains enforceable, and a set of abortion
providers in the state decides to resume post-heartbeat abortions on a clandestine
basis in defiance of the legislation.
527. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.203(b), (d)(3) (West 2021).
528. Id. § 171.204(a).
529. Id. § 171.205(a)-(b).
530. Id. § 171.208(a).
531. Id. § 171.208(a)(2).
532. Id. § 171.208(f).
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If the plaintiff prevails in a civil action under S.B. 8, the statute
instructs the court to award injunctive relief sufficient to prevent
further violations, statutory damages of "not less than $10,000" for
each abortion, and costs and attorney's fees.5 33 The substantive
provisions of the statute are to be enforced "exclusively" through
private civil actions.53 4 State officials and employees may not enforce
or threaten enforcement of the statute's requirements and may not
intervene in actions filed by private claimants.5 3 5 A majority of the
United States Supreme Court understood a savings clause in S.B. 8
to permit action by state licensing authorities against medical
professionals who violate the statute, but the Texas Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that even those licensing officials lack any
enforcement authority. 536
The provisions of S.B. 8 aggressively stack the deck in favor of
claimants and make actions under the statute difficult to defend. The
private civil action can be filed against a defendant in any Texas
county where the claimant resides, and venue cannot be transferred
without the consent of all parties.5 37 Nothing in the statute prevents
multiple claimants from filing suit regarding the same abortion, and
the statute does not recognize a defense of "non-mutual issue
preclusion or non-mutual claim preclusion."5 38 Thus, a Dallas
abortion clinic alleged to have violated the statute could be sued by
claimants in many different counties with respect to the same
abortion. Even if the clinic won a case in one county, the matter would
not be barred by res judicataand other cases could proceed elsewhere
in the state. 539 The most helpful defense for the clinic under the
statute may be a provision that bars relief if the defendant "paid the
full amount of statutory damages . .. in a previous action" with
respect to the same abortion.5 40 Ironically, a clinic might be better off
confessing judgment and paying a $10,000 statutory damage award
533.
534.
535.
536.
(2021),

Id. § 171.208(b).
Id. § 171.207(a).
Id. §§ 171.207(a), 171.208(h).
Compare Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 535-37
with Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 642 S.W.3d 569, 583 (2022)

(opinion on certified question from United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit).
537. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.210(a)(4), (b) (West 2021).
538. Id. § 171.208(e)(5).
539. Id. See also Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Administrative Law,
Constitutional Law, and Civil Procedure Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of
the Application to Vacate Stay of Preliminary Injunction, United States v. Texas,

142 S. Ct. 14 (2021) (No. 21A85) ("The law provides no mechanism for plaintiffs
.

or courts to coordinate enforcement decisions or duplicative actions, and . .
blocks courts from giving res judicata effect to claims and issues litigated to their
conclusion in prior suits.").

540.

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 171.208(c) (West 2021).
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in order to cut off duplicative claims, even if the clinic has evidence
that a particular abortion complied with statutory requirements.
541
The fee-shifting provisions of S.B. 8 also seem quite one-sided.
It is worth recalling that English informers under the Sunday
Observance statute risked an order to pay costs, including the
defendant's attorney's fees, if an action was unsuccessful, potentially
542
As
heading off even greater abuses in enforcement of the statute.
and
"costs
award"
noted above, S.B. 8 provides that a court "shall
attorney's fees" to a prevailing plaintiff.54 3 The statute expressly bars
an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant "under the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure or any other rule adopted by the supreme
court." 544 One litigant argues that S.B. 8 would permit a Texas court
to shift fees in favor of a defendant under a statutory provision
barring frivolous, vexatious, or harassing conduct, 545 but that's much
more limited than the automatic award of attorney's fees to a
prevailing plaintiff. 546
PotentialManifestationsof an S.B. 8 Informer's Conflict of
B.
Interest
The unique enforcement mechanism incorporated into S.B. 8
accomplished the Texas legislature's goal of preventing preenforcement review of the statute in federal court through a suit
against state officials. 547 It seemed for a while that the only way to
obtain a court ruling on S.B. 8's constitutionality might be as a
defense to an action filed under the statute. 548 Alan Braid, a doctor
in San Antonio, published a letter in the Washington Post shortly

541. See id. § 171.208(b)(3), (i) (mandating the award of court costs and
attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs but never defendants).
542.

See Petersen, supra note 472, at 1.

543. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(b)(3) (West 2021).
544. Id. § 171.208(i).
545. Reply Brief for Respondent Mark Lee Dickson at 2, Whole Woman's
Health v. Jackson, No. 21-463 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2021) (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE §§ 10.001-10.006 (2021)).
546. S.B. 8 also seeks to deter challenges to abortion legislation by making an
attorney or law firm jointly and severally liable to pay the attorney's fees of the
prevailing party if the attorney "seeks declaratory or injunctive relief to
any person" from enforcing a law that regulates abortions. TEX. CIV.
prevent ...

PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.022(a) (West 2021). It has been argued that this
liability would not attach to an attorney who merely raised a constitutional
defense to an action under S.B. 8. See Reply Brief for Respondent Mark Lee
Dickson, supranote 545, at 3.
547.

See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.

548. See generally Kate Zernike and Adam Liptak, Texas Supreme Court
Shuts Down Final Challenge to Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 11, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/us/texas-abortion-law.html

failure of all pre-enforcement challenges).

(reporting

on
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after the statute went into effect claiming that he had performed a
first-trimester abortion in violation of S.B. 8.549 One reason for
publicly confessing to the statutory violation was "to make sure that
Texas didn't get away with its bid to prevent this blatantly
unconstitutional law from being tested." 550
The Washington Post published Dr. Braid's letter on Saturday,
September 18, 2021.551 On Monday morning, September 20, two
individuals from other states filed suit against Dr. Braid under S.B. 8.
The first case was filed by Felipe Gomez, an attorney disbarred by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for
sending harassing and threatening communications and filing
frivolous complaints against other attorneys. 552 Gomez styled himself

"Pro Choice

Plaintiff'

and

labeled

Dr.

Braid

"Pro

Choice

Defendant." 553 Rather than asking for statutory damages under S.B.
8, Gomez asked the court "to declare that the Act is Unconstitutional,
and in violation of Roe v Wade." 554
The second complaint was filed later the same morning by Oscar
Stilley, who described himself as "a disbarred and disgraced former
Arkansas lawyer." 555 Stilley acknowledged in the complaint that he
year of a fifteen-year federal home
was serving the twelfth
confinement sentence for tax evasion and conspiracy, though he
criticized the federal charges as "utterly fraudulent" and indicated
that he expects to eventually be exonerated. 556 Stilley requested
relief including "the sum of $100,000, but in no case less than the
statutory minimum of $10,000."557 Stilley told reporters that he was
not opposed to abortion and wanted to facilitate a challenge to the
law.5 58 However, he also indicated that he would be happy to take the

549.

Alan Braid, Why I Violated Texas's Extreme Abortion Ban, WASH. POST

(Sept. 18, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.comlopinions/2021/09/18/texasabortion-provider-alan-braid/.

550. Id.
551. Id.
552. In re Gomez, 829 F. App'x 136, 137 (7th Cir. 2020).
553. See Complaint, Gomez v. Braid, No. 2021C119920 (224th Dist. Ct., Bexar
Cnty., Tex. Sept. 20, 2021).
554. Id. ¶ 2.
555. Complaint, Stilley v. Braid ¶ 3, No. 2021C119940 (438th Dist. Ct., Bexar
Cnty., Tex. Sept. 20, 2021).
556. Id. ¶¶ 4-6.
557. Id. ¶ 27.
558. Sanford Nowlin, Two Separate Suits Filed Against San Antonio Doctor
who PerformedAbortion in Violation of Texas Law, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (Sept.
21, 2021, 9:30 AM), https://www.sacurrent.com/sanantonio/two-separate-suits-

filed-against-san-antonio-doctor-who-performed-abortion-in-violation-of-texaslaw/Content?oid=27179092.
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money if he won: "If there's a $10,000 pot of gold at the end of this
rainbow, I want it. Why shouldn't I get it?"559
Texas Right to Life, which worked to enact S.B. 8, was not happy
with these first two cases filed under the law. 560 A spokesperson for
the organization described the filings as "bogus" and complained that
"neither of these lawsuits are valid attempts to save innocent
lives." 561 Another Texas Right to Life official complained that "[b]oth
cases are self-serving legal stunts, abusing the cause of action created
in the Texas Heartbeat Act for their own purposes." 562
What Texas Right to Life highlights concerning these first two
lawsuits under S.B. 8 is the informer's conflict of interest, which is
inevitable when a legislature authorizes significant financial rewards
for popular enforcement. By permitting any member of the public to
sue and offering financial rewards as an inducement, the statute
virtually invites litigation by individuals pursuing personal agendas
that may not align with the legislative purposes underlying the
statute. Assuming S.B. 8 continues to be enforced, the cases filed by
Gomez and Stilley may be the first of many that prioritize interests
of the informer over legislative goals or the common good more
broadly defined.
1.

Technical Statutory Violations

S.B. 8 allows a lawsuit against any person "who performs or
induces an abortion in violation of' the statute.5 63 One can envision
actions by informers that clearly further the legislative goals. The
claimant might possess strong evidence that a person performed an
elective abortion well after commencement of a detectible fetal
heartbeat. One can even imagine cases under the statute that would
have been permissible under pre-Dobbs federal case law concerning
559.
Law,

Jason Whitely, Meet the Two 'Yahoos' Suing over Texas' New Abortion
WFAA
(Sept.
28,
2021,
4:15
PM),

https://www. wfaa.com/article/news/local/texas/meet-two-yahoos-suing-texas-

new-abortion-law-yallitics-attorney-arkansas/287-60fe5362-480c-4c86-970e76c36231ac9b. A third lawsuit against Dr. Braid was filed in Smith County,
Texas by an organization called the Texas Heartbeat Project.

See Lauren

Goodman, Reproductive Rights Groups Seek to Combine Lawsuits Against Texas
Physician Who Violated Abortion Law, KXAN (Oct. 5, 2021, 6:50 PM),
https://www.kxan.com/news/reproductive-rights-group-seeks-to-combine-

lawsuits-against-texas-physician-who-violated-abortion-law/.
560. See Madison Hall, The Anti-Abortion Group that Championed Texas'
Vigilante Law Is Upset 2 PeopleSuing over Abortion Aren't Making 'Valid Attempts
to Save Innocent Human Lives,' Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2021, 11:16 AM),
https ://www.businessinsider.com/texas-anti-abortion-group-is-upset-that-lawsuitsarent-saving-lives-2021-9.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(a)(1) (West 2021).
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privacy rights. Three individuals intervened in the Department of
Justice lawsuit challenging S.B. 8, claiming that they only wanted to
pursue enforcement actions under the statute in situations where
then-existing case law would reject a substantive due process claim,
such as "non-physician abortions" or "post-viability abortions that are
not necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." 564
On the other hand, it is also easy to imagine informers bringing
actions based on conduct that violates the terms of the statute, but
only in technical ways tangential to the core legislative purposes. As
the Supreme Court recognized in Hughes Aircraft, a financially
motivated private informer may be more likely than a government
attorney to file a claim based on "a mere technical noncompliance
with reporting requirements." 565 Consider a case where a doctor
performed an abortion early in pregnancy after conducting
appropriate tests and determining there was not yet a fetal heartbeat.
Through an oversight, the doctor did not record all of the information
S.B. 8 requires in the patient's medical records, omitting "the
estimated gestational age of the unborn child," or the method used to
make the estimate, or neglecting to specify the "date" and "time" of
the required heartbeat test. 566 A government attorney convinced that
the doctor substantially complied with the statute would likely direct
limited enforcement resources to other cases.
For an informer,
however, the legislature's policy objectives may be less significant
than the perceived likelihood of collecting a forfeiture from the
defendant. Similarly, an acquisitive informer might be less concerned
than a government attorney about the risks of second-guessing
medical determinations and might therefore be more likely to bring a
case challenging a doctor's conclusion that a medical emergency
justified a post-heartbeat abortion or alleging that the doctor failed to
567
properly document the emergency as required by the statute.
Claims based on technical or attenuated readings of S.B. 8 may
be even more likely under the provision allowing suit against anyone
who "knowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets the
performance or inducement of an abortion."5 6 8 Pre-Roe case law holds
that knowingly driving someone to the site of an illegal abortion can
be an act aiding and abetting the abortion. 569 Anticipating claims of
this nature, the Lyft and Uber ride sharing services have announced

564. See Brief for Intervenor-Respondents at 6, U.S. v. Texas, No. 21-588,
(U.S. Oct. 27, 2021).
565. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949
(1997).
566. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.203(d) (West 2021).
567. Id. § 171.205(b)(1), (c).
568. Id. § 171.208(a)(2).
569. State v. Siekermann, 367 S.W.2d 643, 648-49 (Mo. 1963).
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that they will pay legal fees for their drivers sued under the statute. 570
Liability might turn on whether the driver had sufficient information
about the destination or purpose of the trip to act "knowingly" within
the meaning of the statute. 57 1 As noted above, liability does not
require knowledge that an abortion would be performed in violation
of the statute, 572 so a driver could conceivably be liable even if the
passenger explained that she was on her way to an abortion clinic,
but assured the driver that she intended to comply with all legal
requirements.

The concept of "aiding and abetting" has sometimes been
interpreted quite broadly. Could an informer bring an S.B. 8 cause of
action against a parent, counselor, or doctor who provided
information to a pregnant teenager about how to access abortion
services or helped put her in contact with an abortion provider?
Individuals have been convicted of aiding and abetting distribution of
illegal drugs when they helped a purchaser find a willing seller. 573
One can argue that merely telling someone where abortions are
performed should be a protected form of free speech. 574 S.B. 8 itself
provides that the legislation "may not be construed to impose liability
on any speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment" or the
comparable provision of the Texas Constitution. 575 But an informer
considering whether to file a claim under S.B. 8 may not care about a
possible free speech defense if he anticipates settling the case before
the First Amendment issue gets litigated.
There are also cases in which a parent's failure to protect a minor
from misconduct by a third party has been found to constitute aiding
and abetting. 576 Could a parent be liable under S.B. 8 based on
knowledge of a planned abortion that the parent did not intervene to
prevent? A government attorney would likely insist on strong

570.
under

Jessica Guynn, Uber and Lyft Will Cover Legal Fees for Drivers Sued
Texas Abortion Law, USA TODAY (Sept. 3, 2021, 9:02 PM),

https://www.usatoday.com/story/techI2021/09/03/abortion-law-texas-uber-lyft-

legal-fees-drivers/5719717001/.
571. See generally H.R. REP. No. 109-51, at 101-04 (2005) (discussing
implications for taxicab drivers under legislative proposal to prohibit interstate
transportation of minors for abortions).
572. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(a)(2) (West 2021); but see id.

§ (f)(1).
573. Lowman v. United States, 632 A.2d 88, 90-92 (D.C. 1993). On the other
hand, merely providing the name and address of the drug dealer might not be
enough for aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 91-92.
574. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-29 (1975) (First Amendment
protected advertisement in Virginia newspaper for New York abortion services

legal where they would be provided).
575. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(g) (West 2021).
576. See People v. Ogg, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 587, 590-91 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013).
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evidence of culpable parental neglect before considering such a claim.
But an informer seeking a quick payout under the statute may care
little about the nuanced and difficult questions of parental
responsibility involved.
The widest latitude for broad construction and inventive pleading
may come through the S.B. 8 provision allowing a claim against any
person who "intends to engage in conduct" that would violate other
provisions. 577 There is pre-Roe case law indicating that a woman
must in fact be pregnant before someone can commit an abortionrelated offense. 578 Thus, a doctor who made contingent plans to
perform an abortion due to his patient's physical build could not be
punished for unprofessional conduct when testing revealed that the
woman was not pregnant. 579 Under S.B. 8, however, where liability
is imposed on anyone who "intends" to aid and abet an abortion, it is
not clear that an actual pregnancy would be a necessary element to
prove a violation. 580 The provision for claims based on intent to aid
and abet an abortion could be especially helpful for informers seeking
to entrap potential defendants, as discussed below.
2.

Inducing Statutory Violations

A legislative body enacting a statute or a public official enforcing
the legislation wants to reduce the occurrence of conduct violating
legislative requirements. An informer seeking to collect penalties, on
the other hand, may benefit from encouraging statutory violations,
even violations that would not otherwise occur, in order to increase
the supply of potential bounties. 581 Informers under the eighteenthcentury Gin Act routinely placed orders for distilled liquors in order
to gather evidence to support claims. 582 Informers who view S.B. 8 as
a business opportunity could take comparable steps aimed at
entrapping potential litigation targets.
Assuming S.B. 8 continues in effect, those who work for the
abortion industry will likely be on guard against pro-life "sting"
operations. Other potential defendants may be less wary. An
informer posing as a woman seeking a post-heartbeat abortion could
solicit support in various forms. She could ask counselors or medical
professionals for advice or abortion referrals. She could seek financial
assistance to pay for an abortion. She could ask someone for a ride to
a clinic.
One can imagine elaborate stories crafted to induce
sympathy from potential litigation targets. 583 Anyone tricked into
577. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(a)(3) (West 2021).
578. See Sherman v. McEntire, 179 P.2d 796, 797-98 (Utah 1947).
579. Id. at 796, 798.
580. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208 (West 2021).
581.
582.

See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 240-75 and accompanying text.

583.

See supra notes 243, 250-51, 256 and accompanying text.
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offering assistance might furnish the evidentiary basis for a claim
that the person "intended" to aid and abet an abortion violating the
statute, even if the informer was not in fact pregnant or had no
intention of actually accessing abortion services.
Another technique for entrapment could come from the opposite
direction. Informers could pose as individuals willing to help people
obtain abortions after the point permitted by S.B. 8. The statute
includes an exemption that prevents a claim against a woman seeking
an abortion. 584 However, in the course of making arrangements for a
promised abortion, the informer might gather evidence concerning
other litigation targets willing to somehow facilitate the transaction
through funding, rides, or other forms of support and who, therefore,
might be liable for intending to aid or abet a post-heartbeat abortion
in violation of the statute.
3.

False or Malicious Accusations

Informers enforcing the Gin Act were routinely prosecuted for
filing false claims that someone had served distilled liquor in violation
of the statute. 585 S.B. 8 creates analogous opportunities for false
allegations that someone "intended" to aid and abet an abortion in
violation of the law. An informer could make fraudulent claims that
a person offered to assist with an illegal abortion. One could even
envision situations where a person filed a claim under S.B. 8 as a
means of leverage in a hard-fought child custody or domestic relations
dispute, perhaps based on a manufactured or exaggerated claim that
a spouse or domestic partner wanted to have a child aborted. 58 6
4.

Abusive Litigation Tactics

One of the earliest critiques of common informers was the use of
abusive litigation tactics designed to make it difficult to defend
against a claim. 587 Sir Edward Coke criticized informers for filing
suits in London, regardless of where the defendant lived. 588 Traveling
to London to mount a defense was expensive and time-consuming,

584. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.206(b)(1) (West 2021).
585. See supra Subpart II.A.2.
586. See In re W.R.M.D., No. 10-07-00046-CV, 2007 WL 3025024, at *1-2
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (in proceeding regarding parental right to determine child's
residence, trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding evidence that father

wanted mother to have an abortion); Lessard v. Londo, No. 336156, 2017 WL
2562569, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) (father in custody action conceded he
initially suggested abortion but claimed he changed his mind when he felt baby
kick); Adoption of B.K., G049223, 2014 WL 3390373, at *1, 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
(upholding termination of parental rights of father who initially suggested
abortion and then consented to adoption).

587.
588.

See Beck, English Eradication,supra note 11, at 583.
Id.
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589
especially if the defendant needed testimony from fact witnesses.
Parliament eventually responded with reform legislation requiring
informers to file suit in the county where an offense occurred. 590
By permitting an informer to file suit in the informer's county of
residence and preventing any change of venue without the informer's
consent, 591 S.B. 8 seems to revive the long-abandoned practice of
making popular actions easy to file and difficult to defend. S.B. 8
includes a generous four-year statute of limitations, 592 much longer
than the one-year statute of limitations Parliament adopted to rein in
sixteenth-century English informers. 593 Blackstone tells us that "the
verdict passed upon the defendant in [a popular action] is a bar to all
594
Once someone
others, and conclusive even to the king himself."
could pursue
else
no
one
law,
English
under
action
had filed a popular
and
defendant
the
between
of
collusion
evidence
the matter absent
595
suits
multiple
allows
hand,
other
on
the
S.B. 8,
the informer.
targeting the same conduct and prevents any defense based on
nonmutual claim preclusion unless the defendant has actually paid
596
statutory damages in an earlier suit.
Pro-life legislators who enacted S.B. 8 may have had little
sympathy for potential defendants, envisioning claims against
abortion providers, clinics, insurance companies, and others who
support a disfavored industry. Informers, on the other hand, may not
limit S.B. 8 litigation exclusively to those the legislators viewed in a
negative light. The tactic of filing a lawsuit far from the defendant's
residence, or multiple informers pursuing concurrent cases in
different parts of the state, could be applied to defendants the Texas
legislature might view with greater sympathy. As the petitioners
argued in Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, anyone aiding a woman
who obtains a prohibited abortion could be "sued in hundreds of
duplicative suits, in courts in every Texas county, by an unlimited
59 7
number of people with no personal connection to the abortion."
To flesh out the concern, imagine that an informer learns of a
college student who obtains a first-trimester abortion believed to have
been performed in violation of S.B. 8. In discovery for a lawsuit
against the doctor, the informer learns that the student paid for the

589.
590.

594.

Id.
Id. at 588.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.210(a)(4) (West 2021).
Id. § 171.208(d).
Beck, English Eradication,supranote 11, at 588.
Id. at 551 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *162).

595.

2 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 33, at 138 (once an informer began a popular

591.
592.
593.

action, no one else could pursue it unless collusion appeared).
596. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(c), (e)(5) (West 2021).
597. Reply Brief for Petitioners, Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, No. 21463 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2021), 2021 U.S. S. Ct. BRIEFS LEXIS 3435, at *4.
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abortion out of a $1,500 payment received shortly beforehand from
her mother, a businesswoman living in a suburb of Dallas. The
informer files suit against the patient's mother in El Paso, 630 miles
from Dallas, claiming the mother aided and abetted the illegal
abortion by funding it. The informer shares the information with an
occasional collaborator, who files another suit against the mother in
McAllen, Texas, 500 miles from the mother's location. A third
informer reads the complaint filed in El Paso and files a copycat
lawsuit against the mother in Lubbock, 350 miles from the mother's
residence.
The mother believes she can establish that the payment to her
daughter was for living expenses and that she did not know her
daughter was pregnant or would use the money to pay for an abortion
violating the statute. However, to defend against the claims filed
under S.B. 8, the mother would need to retain lawyers and litigate
suits pending in three widely separated locations, all remote from
where she lives. Even if the mother prevailed in one action, that
would not preclude the other two informers from proceeding against
her. The mother might prevail in all three suits, but only after
spending tens of thousands of dollars, or perhaps hundreds of
thousands, on legal fees and travel expenses. None of these expenses
would be recoverable from the informer unless the mother could
convince a court that the claim was frivolous and warranted
sanctions. If the mother loses on any of the suits, she will have to pay
at least $10,000 in statutory damages, plus the informer's attorney's
fees, in addition to any litigation and travel expenses incurred in
defending the action. 598
5.

Payments to Suppress Litigation

One recurring manifestation of a common informer's conflict of
interest has been solicitation of payments to suppress litigation.
Anthony Houghton-le-Touzel, for instance, in settling cases against
English dance halls under the Sunday Observance Act, sometimes
sweetened the settlement offer with a promise to leave the defendant
alone for a period of time. 599 Those enforcing the Gin Act were
repeatedly convicted of extortion for collecting money to suppress
600
litigation against retailers of distilled liquors.
S.B. 8 provides fertile soil for similar activities. Consider our
hypothetical Dallas mother discussed in the previous Subpart.
Suppose an informer learns that the mother had supplied the money
her college-aged daughter used in paying for a post-heartbeat
abortion. The informer meets with the mother privately and shares

598.
599.
600.

See id.
See supranotes 498-502 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 301-07 and accompanying text.
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the information he has learned about the source of abortion funding.
He explains how S.B. 8 operates and the large expenses the mother is
likely to incur if the informer files suit. On the other hand, he lets it
be known that there would be no need for a lawsuit and the informer
would be happy to keep the information private if the mother would
just pay him $10,000, the minimum he would recover if the claim is
successful. Many people would be tempted by that offer, particularly
if they are concerned not just about the expense and time of litigation,
but also the reputational damage they might suffer.
6.

Delaying Litigation

A government attorney enforcing S.B. 8 would presumably be
interested in preventing the occurrence of abortions violating the
statute. If the attorney acquired solid evidence that a person
performed an abortion violating the statute, the attorney would be
apt to file suit early in order to obtain injunctive relief. On the other
hand, the financial rewards available to an informer depend on the
number of illegal abortions performed and the number of separate
individuals who aided and abetted each abortion. If an informer
obtained information about a doctor or clinic that sometimes violates
the statute, the informer might be inclined to keep the information
secret to allow the number of abortions and the number of litigation
targets to increase before filing suit. In a system where the first claim
filed takes precedence, the incentive to delay would be balanced by
the desire to establish priority. However, since S.B. 8 permits
multiple suits arising from the same abortion, the informer's risk in
delaying litigation is reduced. 601 If someone else files suit first, the
informer might still be in a position to litigate more quickly and
obtain the first recovery.
7.

Collusive Litigation

One early abuse identified in the history of popular enforcement
involved collusion between potential defendants and friendly
informers.6 0 2 An informer might file a claim under a qui tam statute
and then settle the action, giving a release to the defendant. Or the
informer might litigate the case to judgment without resistance by
the defendant based on a secret agreement to accept a smaller
payment than the forfeiture called for by the legislation. A fifteenthcentury statute from the reign of Henry VII sought to prevent use of
a prior recovery as a bar to litigation if it could be shown that the
prior case was the product of collusion.6 03

601.
602.

See supra notes 538-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.

603.

Beck, English Eradication, supra note 11, at 574.
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Oscar Stilley, one of the first two plaintiffs to file suit under S.B.
8, has apparently spent some of his time in home confinement
thinking about possible ways to manipulate the statute in order to
allow post-heartbeat abortions to continue. He was sufficiently proud
of his solution to outline it in a federal court filing after he intervened
604
in the Justice Department's lawsuit against the State of Texas.
Under his plan, Stilley would quickly file an S.B. 8 suit against a
defendant-e.g., an insurance company-even if another informer
sued them first. 605 He would then immediately call the defendant's
lawyer to propose a settlement. 606 The company would confess to a
judgment of $10,000 per abortion. 607 Stilley would then sell the
judgment to a third party for as little as $100.608 The third-party
assignee would accept a promissory note for the amount of the
judgment from the defendant and enter satisfaction of the judgment
in the court records. 609 If the defendant was sued by anyone else, the
defendant could plead the satisfaction of the earlier judgment as a
defense. 6 10
The scheme apparently depends on collusion between the
defendant and the third-party purchaser of the judgment obtained by
If the third party decided to collect on the proffered
Stilley.
promissory note, the defendant would not have improved its position.
On this point, Stilley wants no information: "What the judgment
debtor and the buyer of the judgment do is no concern of Stilley. In
fact, Stilley prefers plausible deniability of knowledge of such
matters." 6 11 But one can imagine a judgment assignee, motivated for
ideological reasons to soften the impact of S.B. 8, willing to pay Stilley
$100 for the judgment and content to leave the promissory note
uncollected.
Stilley's scheme presumably would not work if the courts looked
behind a recorded satisfaction of judgment. S.B. 8 only recognizes a
defense for a defendant who "previously paid the full amount of
statutory damages" for a particular abortion,6 12 and a promissory note
might not suffice to demonstrate payment of "the full amount."61 3 On
604. Intervenor Oscar Stilley's Response in Opposition to the United States'
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction at 6, United

States v. Texas, No. 1:21-cv-796 RP (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2021).
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(c) (West 2021).
613. Intervenor Oscar Stilley's Response in Opposition to the United States'
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, United
States v. Texas at 6, No. 1:21-cv-796 RP, (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2021).
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the other hand, there could be variations on Stilley's proposal that
might be more successful. For instance, one suspects there may be
informers willing to sue quickly, accept full payment from the
defendant to satisfy a confessed judgment, and then voluntarily
donate most of the proceeds back to the defendant.
Whether or not Stilley's proposal could work, it illustrates how
an informer's interests may conflict with legislative goals. The Texas
legislature wants to deter post-heartbeat abortions and set the
61 4
penalty at a high enough level to accomplish that purpose.
However, whether defendants are deterred from offering postheartbeat abortions is a matter of indifference to Stilley, who is happy
to make a quick $100 per abortion and then walk away. One suspects
Stilley is not the only potential informer trying to identify
mechanisms that would allow abortion clinics to continue offering
post-heartbeat abortions in Texas, notwithstanding S.B. 8.
C.

UnintendedDownsides of S.B. 8

Texas legislators provided for popular enforcement of S.B. 8 to
They hoped the absence of
address a very specific problem.
enforcement mechanisms for state officials would prevent federal
615
courts from rendering the law a nullity before it went into effect.
The law accomplished that purpose. It went into effect without being
enjoined by the federal courts, and abortion providers adjusted their
conduct accordingly. 616 The Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs has
largely addressed the Texas legislature's concern about a federal
court enjoining enforcement of a fetal heartbeat law. 617 Even if such
a law was enforced by state officials, it would presumptively satisfy
618
Dobbs' rational basis standard for abortion regulations.
Some pro-life legislators may argue that popular enforcement
remains necessary to solve the problem of public officials reluctant to
bring enforcement actions. At least five district attorneys in Texas
have announced their intention not to enforce the state's abortion
legislation. 6 19 However, that concern could be addressed without
resort to popular enforcement. For instance, enforcement power

614.
615.
616.

617.

Cf. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.208(b) (West 2021).
Cf. id. § 171.208; see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.

See Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2279 (2022)

(authority to regulate
representatives).

abortion

rests

with the

people and their elected

618. Id. at 2284.
619. See Brad Johnson, 'Don't Enforce Abortion Law' Texas Democratic Party
Tells Local Officials and Law Enforcement, TEXAN (June 24, 2022),
https://thetexan.news/dont-enforce-abortion-law-texas-democratic-party-tellslocal-officials-and-law-enforcement/ (five district attorneys declare intention not
to enforce Texas abortion restrictions).
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could be distributed concurrently to multiple public officials.62 0 Or
enforcement could be allowed by individuals aggrieved by a
violation. 21
Even though S.B. 8 has fully accomplished its principal purpose,
its provisions authorizing popular enforcement remain on the books.
Assuming the statute remains enforceable, what unforeseen
consequences might it produce beyond the intended consequences
envisioned by the legislature? The legislators who voted on S.B. 8 did
not have a broad base of experience with popular enforcement. The
state does make qui tam enforcement available under the Texas
Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act, comparable to the federal FCA.622
But popular enforcement has not been widely utilized in a manner
that would acquaint the average Texas legislator with the dynamics
of such litigation.
The history of popular enforcement, particularly with respect to
controversial legislation, provides a glimpse of unintended paths
enforcement may take under S.B. 8 if it survives review under state
constitutional law.6 23 The powerful legal weapon fashioned in S.B. 8
has been made available to anyone who wishes to take it up.6 24 Some
plaintiffs will be ideological allies of the legislation's sponsors,
sharing their commitment to suppressing post-heartbeat abortions.
Other plaintiffs with no particular commitment to the legislature's
aims will embrace the statute as an engine of financial reward or a
means to other private ends. A few, like Britain's Common Informer
No. 1, Alfred Green a.k.a. Anthony Houghton le Touzel, may read S.B.
8 and "recognise its possibilities," setting aside other pursuits to make
6 25
a living enforcing the statute.

620. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalismand CriminalLaw: What the Feds Can
Learn from the States, 109 MIcH. L. REv. 519, 544-69 (2011) (many states confer
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Texas' fetal heartbeat legislation could take on a very different
cast in the minds of the public if S.B. 8 actions end up being directed
at friends and family members of women seeking abortions, rather
than being confined to doctors and others who work for abortion
clinics. A few accounts of S.B. 8 plaintiffs committing perjury or
extortion, or even encouraging people to facilitate post-heartbeat
abortions in order to trick them into violating the statute, could
quickly build public opposition to the legislation. Just as the Lord's
Day Observance Society found itself responding to claims that it was
responsible for the activities of informers under England's Sunday
Observance Act,6 26 Texas Right to Life may end up having to issue a
series of press releases distancing the organization from plaintiffs
filing unseemly S.B. 8 claims.
The provisions designed to make S.B. 8 actions difficult to
defend-authorizing venue in the plaintiff's home county, allowing
multiple informers to file actions relating to the same conduct, and
imposing one-sided liability for payment of attorney's fees-could
easily contribute to public disenchantment with the statute.6 27 An
S.B. 8 defendant who lacks the means to defend himself in court may
instead try his case in the media. Imagine the effect of multiple press
accounts concerning individuals who could prove they complied with
S.B. 8, but who nevertheless paid $10,000 to an S.B. 8 plaintiff
because it was so much cheaper than defending multiple lawsuits in
remote locations. As S.B. 8 lawsuits proliferate and stories circulate
of marginal claims or abusive litigation tactics directed at people with
little connection to the abortion industry, public opposition may build
and pro-life Texans may come to see.the statute as a liability for their
cause.
CONCLUSION

Texas legislators who voted for S.B. 8 were persuaded to
undertake an experiment with popular enforcement of abortion
legislation. The history of popular enforcement, particularly in the
context of controversial legislation, suggests they may not be happy
with the results if the statute is ever widely enforced.6 28 Legislators
addressing controversial areas of law should look elsewhere for
models of enforcement.
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